OSCAR L. OLIVER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Oscar L. Oliver appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, challenging the trial court's refusal to give special jury instructions on the element of guilty knowledge. The court reverses, holding that following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Chicone v. State, trial courts must provide requested special instructions clarifying that guilty knowledge requires awareness of the illicit nature of the substance possessed.
Trial courts must provide requested special jury instructions that expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed, as this element is necessarily included in possession of controlled substance and drug paraphernalia statutes.
[1] A conviction for possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia requires proof that the defendant had knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance or obje…
[2] When specifically requested by a defendant, a trial court must instruct the jury that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the existing jury instructions are adequate in requiring "knowledge of the presence of the substance," we agree that, if specifically requested by a defendant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed.”
This quote from Chicone v. State establishes the holding that trial courts must provide special instructions on guilty knowledge when requested, clarifying that knowledge of illicit nature is required.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOliver was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia under Florida Statutes sections 893.13(6)(a) and 893.147(1). The tr…
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PARKER, Chief Judge.
Oscar L. Oliver appeals the order adjudicating him guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to give his special jury instructions. We agree and reverse.
In this case, the State charged Oliver with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of sections 893.13(6)(a) and 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (1995). The trial court provided the standard jury instructions on these charges, but denied Oliver’s requested special jury instructions. Oliver’s special jury instructions stated that to find the defendant guilty of possession, the jury would have to find that he was aware of the illicit nature of the substance or object he possessed.1
Oliver argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1996), is directly on point. In Chicone, the supreme court interpreted both section 893.13(6)(a) and section 893.147(1) as necessarily including a scienter requirement (i.e. the element of “guilty knowledge”). See id. at 738, 743-44.
In addressing the jury instructions for the two possession crimes, the Chicone court concluded that the standard instructions do not contain an adequate statement regarding the requisite, “guilty knowledge” element. Thus, the supreme court held:
While the existing jury instructions are adequate in requiring “knowledge of the presence of the substance,” we agree that, if specifically requested by a defendant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed.
Id. at 745-46.
Although the trial court did not have the benefit of the Chicone opinion when it ruled on Oliver’s requested jury instructions, we conclude that the holding in Chicone must be applied to this ease. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to give the requested jury instructions. Moreover, the trial court’s error in denying Oliver’s special jury instructions was not harmless where lack of guilty knowledge was Oliver’s principal defense. The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the crimes charged adversely affected Oliver’s substantial rights and, therefore, cannot be regarded as harmless error.' See Koltay v. State, 860 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON and NORTHCUTT, JJ„ concur. . Regarding the possession of a controlled substance charge, Oliver requested the following special instruction: "Before you can find the Defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, you must find beyond all reasonable doubt that the Defendant had knowledge that the pipes contained cocaine.” Regarding the possession or drug paraphernalia charge, Oliver requested a special instruction stating: "Before you can find the Defendant guilty of possession of paraphernalia, you must find beyond all reasonable doubt that the Defendant had knowledge that the pipes were in the cigarette pack.”
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Citator
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Gross v. State, 765 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2000)…st DCA 1990)). Hence, where a defendant, in the absence of a sufficient standard instruction, requests an accurate instruction on her defense, the failure to give such an instruction will ordinarily constitute reversible error. See Oliver v. State, 707 So. 2d 771, 772-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Generally, the defendant is entitled to an instruction where (1) the requested instruction accurately states the law, (2) the facts in the case support the giving of the instruction, and (3) the instruction is necessary t…
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Lambert v. State, 728 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…lding in Chicone appears to be equally applicable to constructive as well as actual possession cases.2 Subsequent to the Chicone decision, this court applied a harmless error analysis to the denial of the requested instruction. See Oliver v. State, 707 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In Oliver, this court found that the error could not be deemed harmless where a lack of guilty knowledge was the principal defense. On the other hand, this court af [*1191] firmed a conviction in which the request for the instruc…
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Guerra-Villafane v. Singletary, 729 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous instruction given in this case did not contribute to the jury’s verdict, the error cannot be deemed harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986); see also Oliver v. State, 707 So. 2d 771, 772-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding trial court’s erroneous instruction on defendant’s principle defense not harmless error). We thus find that the failure to raise this issue on the direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate coun…
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- Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)