MICHAEL SMITH WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Smith Wilson was convicted of manslaughter with a firearm after being charged with second degree murder. He appealed on the grounds that the trial court should have granted judgment of acquittal or that confusing jury instructions on self-defense and the duty to retreat warranted a new trial. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence for jury consideration and that the instructions were not internally inconsistent.
The trial court properly denied judgment of acquittal because, while evidence was close, defendant's own statements to police and the absence of gunpowder residue on the victim created jury questions about whether he reasonably feared for his safety. The jury instructions were not confusingly inconsistent because they clearly stated the general duty to retreat but immediately clarified that no retreat was necessary on one's own home ground.
[1] A judgment of acquittal is not warranted when evidence, even if substantial, presents questions of fact for the jury regarding the defendant's state of mind and the circu…
[2] The presence or absence of gunpowder residue on a victim can be a question of fact for the jury to consider in determining the circumstances of a shooting.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“His own statements to the police just after the incident, however, are enough to cast doubt on the requisite state of mind and thus to send the case to the jury.”
Establishes that defendant's post-incident statements were sufficient to prevent directed acquittal and create a jury question on self-defense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant shot and killed someone within the curtilage of his own residence. Substantial evidence supported that the shooting may have been in self-de…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FARMER, Judge.
Following a jury trial for second degree murder with a firearm, defendant appeals from his conviction for manslaughter with a firearm and prison sentence of 9/é years. We affirm.
The defense was “self defense.” The killing occurred within the curtilage at defendant’s residence. There was substantial evidence that indeed the shooting was done in self defense. Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal. Failing that, he contends that we should order a new trial because of confusing jury instructions.
With regard to the judgment of acquittal, the evidence is very close and a great deal of it objectively supports defendant’s position. On the other hand, there are two areas that create jury questions as to guilt. The essential question in defendant’s theory of self defense was whether he reasonably feared for his own safety or that of his roommate. His own statements to the police just after the incident, however, are enough to cast doubt on the requisite state of mind and thus to send the ease to the jury.1 Moreover, there was no gun powder residue on the victim, as there might have been if the shooting occurred as defendant describes it. Whether the rain was sufficient to obliterate or entirely erase any residue that might have been there is, it seems to us, a question for the jury. •
As to the jury instructions, defendant argues that the instructions are internally inconsistent and thus intolerably unclear because they first state that defendant, was obligated to retreat to avoid the use of force justifiably, on the one hand, and then that defendant need not retreat within his own home or curtilage to justify any use of deadly force to protect himself within that special location, on the other. Defendant relies on Butler v. State, 493 So. 2d 451 (Fla.1986), and Desouza v. State, 650 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In both of those eases, however, the trial court changed “defendant” to “person” in the retreat instruction, thus altering its meaning. Moreover as the court held in Butler, the mere fact that defendant was on his home ground does not by itself mean that deadly force was as a matter of law justifiable — that, e.g., defendant could use a firearm against an unarmed man in that grossly inebriated condition.
We disagree that the instructions are thus unclear. While they do state the necessity to retreat as a general proposition, they make clear in the very next breath that retreat is not necessary on one’s own home ground. None of the eases relied on by defendant holds that it is ambiguous to charge the general retreat instruction, as well as the right to defend in one’s home without retreat, both in the same case. As the evidence was undisputed that the events all occurred on defendant’s own home ground, the jury could not reasonably have been mislead into thinking that further retreat within or outside the home grounds was still necessary for justification.
AFFIRMED.
GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . Defendant told the police that “the last time he lunged at me, I just popped him.” He also said that he was tired of being hurt by bullies and, on his home turf, he 'was not going to be bullied by anyone.
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Citator
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Dias v. State, 812 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…round and meet force with force, even to the extent of using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, if it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm, to himself or another of the commission of a forcible felony. Wilson v. State, 707 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), is on point. In Wilson, the court included both the duty to retreat and the privilege of non-retreat in the justifiable use of deadly force instruction. We held the instruction was not ambiguous or misleading where it was undisp…
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Geffkin v. State, 820 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…weighed seventy-five and eighty-five pounds'respectively and did not have any weapons or tools in their possession.1 Thus, questions of reasonable belief and amount of force necessary for protection were questions for the jury. See Wilson v. State, 707 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(holding that defendant convicted of manslaughter of victim within the curtilage of the defendant’s home was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal because a jury question was presented on his self-defense defense, i.e., whether…
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Segura v. State, 972 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…the reading of both instructions on the duty to retreat and the absence of a [*1107] duty to retreat is confusing. See Liotta v. State, 939 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Dias v. State, 812 So. 2d 487, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Wilson v. State, 707 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Accord Barnes v. State, 922 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), quashed on other grounds, 970 So. 2d 332 (Fla.2007); Wiggins v. State, 792 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). We likewise reject Segura’s contention in this case. T…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Butler v. State, 493 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1986)
- Rosly Desouza v. State, 650 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)