STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
M.A.P., A CHILD, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-03-27
No. 97-02908
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and GREEN, JJ., concur.
708 So. 2d 322 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The trial court erred by refusing to suspend the driver's license of a defendant under 18 who was found guilty of a qualifying offense.


Facts & Procedural History

The appellee pled guilty to misdemeanor marijuana possession while under 18. The trial court withheld adjudication and ordered community control but r…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals the sentence imposed upon the appellee, M.A.P., after he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. We reverse.

The State charged M.A.P. with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. He pled guilty. The trial court withheld adjudication and ordered that M.A.P. be placed on community control. At the sentencing hearing the state requested that the trial court suspend M.A.P.’s driver’s license. The trial court postponed a decision on this matter but eventually refused to suspend M.A.P.’s driver’s license. The State filed a timely appeal.

The State contends that the trial court erred by refusing to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend M.A.P.’s driver’s license. We agree. Section 322.056, Florida Statutes (1995), requires a trial court to direct that the driving privileges of persons under 18 years of age be suspended if they have been found guilty of or delinquent for a violation of certain offenses. It is undisputed that the charge in this case falls within the statute. The language of section-322.056 leaves no discretion in the trial court. See State v. M.D., 706 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

Because M.A.P.’s guilty plea was entered while he was 17 years of age, the trial court was required to direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend his driving privileges. The failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and GREEN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. M.L.R., 722 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …enile’s driving privileges when the court finds the juvenile guilty of or delinquent for certain alcohol, drug, or tobacco offenses. The trial court lacks discretion as to whether it can impose a suspension under this provision. See State v. M.A.P., 708 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. R.N., 597 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Upon a first violation, the trial court does have discretion as to the length of the suspension and may order the suspension for “[n]ot less than 6 months and not more than 1 yea…
  • State v. J.M.H., 717 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …PER CURIAM. The order denying the state’s motion to suspend the child’s driving privileges is reversed. State v. M.A.P., 708 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. M.D., 706 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. R.N., 597 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…

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