HOTELERA NACO, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA E. CHINEA, APPELLEE
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Trial court erred in excluding evidence of plaintiff's post-partum activities as hearsay when offered to show employer's nondiscriminatory state of mind in pregnancy discrimination case; reversed and remanded for new trial.
Evidence of reports that an employee was seen shopping and may have traveled after claiming to convalesce from stillbirth is admissible when offered to prove the employer's state of mind rather than for its truth, and is relevant to nondiscriminatory intent in a pregnancy discrimination termination case.
[1] Evidence of reports regarding an employee's activities after claiming to convalesce from childbirth is admissible in a pregnancy discrimination case when offered to prove…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaria E. Chinea, a former employee of Hotelera Naco, Inc., obtained a judgment against her employer under Dade County Code section 11A-27 for pregnanc…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
Maria E. Chinea obtained a judgment against her former employer, Hotelera Naco, Inc., on a claim under Dade County Code, section 11A-27 which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or discharge an employee on account of pregnancy.
We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of reports heard by the employer that, instead of being at home convalescing after giving birth to her stillborn child, plaintiff had been seen shopping and may have travelled to the Bahamas.1 The trial court excluded this evidence on the ground that it was hearsay and not relevant.
However, we agree with appellant’s contention that, because the reports were being offered to prove the employer’s state of mind in deciding to terminate the plaintiff and not for their truth, the evidence was not inadmissible as hearsay. See § 90.801(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995); Hunt v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 327 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1976); Williams v. State, 338 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Also, because the evidence was intended to prove the employer’s nondiscriminatory intent in discharging the plaintiff, it cannot be said that it was not relevant. See §§ 90.401, .402, Fla. Stat. (1995); Duncan v. State, 616 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); E.B. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
We therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
. This court's opinion should not be read to diminish in any way the profound grief and emotional trauma suffered by the plaintiff over the loss of her child. However, under the circumstances of this case, we have no choice but to reverse and remand.
FLETCHER, Judge.
The motion for rehearing filed by appellant, Hotelera Naco, Inc., is hereby-granted and our original opinion is amended as follows:
We also conclude that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award damages for mental anguish and loss of dignity, and awarding appellee, Maria E. Chi-nea, attorney’s fees. The ordinance in effect at the time the cause of action arose only allowed for the award of quantifiable damages. Dade County Code § HA-5(9). Ap-pellee argues that she was entitled to an award for mental anguish and loss of dignity, as well as an award of attorney’s fees, based on language added to Dade County Code § 11A-12(4) in 1995. As a general rule, however, in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law affecting substantive rights is presumed to apply prospectively. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1995); Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1994); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla.1994). There is no question that the changes made to the ordinance in 1995 (including those providing for attorney’s fees) are substantive in nature, and thus, may not be applied retroactively to this ease.1 L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1986).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with this amended opinion.
. We have not overlooked the fact that the amended attorney’s fee provision states that it applies to any complaint pending on the effective date of the ordinance, April 18, 1995, and that this case was pending on that date., If the new law “impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties,” the courts may refuse to apply it retroactively notwithstanding clear .evidence of legislative intent to the contrary. Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 61.
We also note that we are making no determination here as to the authority, or lack of authority, for Dade County to enact ordinances providing for attorney’s fees in any case.
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Daniel Weingrad, M.D. v. Miles, 29 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…apply retrospectively. Specifically, we reject reliance on: Mancusi, 632 So. 2d at 1357 (where the statute at issue, section 768.73, Florida Statutes (1987), included no legislative intent for retroactive application); Hotelera Naco, Inc. v. Chinea, 708 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (holding that where no clear legislative intent exists, a substantive statute is presumed to operate prospectively); Patria Publ’ns, Inc. v. Armesto, 593 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (where the statute in question stated tha…
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THE Palms v. Magil Constr. Fla., Inc., 785 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…then it worked a change in the substantive rights of contractors. Since that is a substantive change in law, the 2000 amendment does not operate retroactively. Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla.1994); Hotelera Naco, Inc. v. Chinea, 708 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We entirely agree with Judge Muir in the denial of the motion to stay arbitration. Affirmed.…
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Aindry DE LA Campa v. Grifols Am., Inc., 819 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…0-32, used to provide for a private cause of action for all claims of discrimination arising under chapter 11A, including employment discrimination. See Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 90-32, (April 3, 1990); Hotelera Naco, Inc. v. Chinea, 708 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). A subsequent amendment to chapter 11A eliminated the express private cause of action contained in section 11A-12. As amended, section 11A-12 became part of article II, which is dedicated [*943] exclusively to housing, and address…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995)
- Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994)
- Arrow AIR, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1994)
- L. Ross, Inc. v. R. W. Roberts Constr. Co., Inc., 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1986)
- Hunt v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 327 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1976)
- E.B. v. State, 531 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Williams v. State, 338 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Duncan v. State, 616 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)