C. HARRIET REED, INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, HARRISON REED, APPELLANT,
v.
MENDEL CROMER, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. | 1923-12-20
Taylor, G. J., and Ellis, J., concur., Whitfield, P. J., and West and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.
86 Fla. 575 Florida Supreme Court (1923) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 98 So. 605 · 1923 Fla. LEXIS 479
Cited by 76 cases

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Synopsis

Mrs. Catherine Harriet Reed appealed a final decree in a chancery case more than eight months after its entry and sought a supersedeas order. The Florida Supreme Court held that appeals in chancery must be taken within six months regardless of the appellant's marital status, and that statutory provisions granting married women two years to sue out writs of error do not extend the time for taking an appeal.


Holding

The court held that Section 3168 controls and requires all appeals in chancery to be taken within six months after entry of the decree, regardless of whether the appellant is a married woman. Section 3173 limits the application of writ of error provisions to post-appeal proceedings and does not extend Section 2910's two-year period to the time for taking an appeal.


Key Quotes

“Section 3168, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, provides that 'Appeals in chancery * * * must be taken within six months after the entry of the order or decree appealed from.'”

Establishes the controlling statute requiring all chancery appeals to be taken within six months regardless of appellant's status

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Facts & Procedural History

Mrs. Catherine Harriet Reed, a married woman joined by her husband Harrison Reed, sought to appeal a final decree in a chancery case more than eight m…

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Opinion of the Court
Browne, J.

Browne, J.

A former appeal of this case was dismissed on motion of appellees, because it was made returnable on a date more than ninety days from the entry of the appeal.

On the 30th day of November, 1923, Mrs. Catherine Harriet Reed, a married woman, one of the former appellants, “individually and joined by her husband,” entered her appeal from the same final decree, more than eight months after its entry.

Application is now made to this court for an order of supersedeas, in the new appeal. Section 2910, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, provides: “Where a married woman shall be a party to-any such judgment she shall be allowed two years in which to sue out a writ of error upon the same.”

Section 3173, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, provides: ‘ ‘ The provisions of law relating to writs of error governing the filing of transcripts of record, and proceedings thereon, and filing assignments of errors, the duty of appellate court in examining the record and giving judgment, in causing execution of its decrees and in quashing writs of error shall be applicable to appeals in chancery. ’ ’

The appellant seeks to find authority for the new appeal in the provisions of these two sections, and contends that because it was taken by Mrs. Catherine Harriet Reed,' a married woman, it comes within their provisions, and can be maintained.

Section 3168, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, provides that “Appeals in chancery * * * must be taken within six months after the entry of the order or decree appealed from.”

Section 3173, Revised General Statutes of Florida, 1920, limits the application of the “provisions of the law relating to writs of error,” to steps taken after the appeal, and confines the application of its provisions to the specific things enumerated therein:”

We think that Section 3168, Revised General Statutes, controls, and that all appeals whether by a married woman or any other person, must be taken within six months after the entry of the order or decree appealed from, and that Section 3173 does not operate to substitute Section 2910 of the Revised General Statutes in relation to the limitation of time for suing out writs of error for Section .3168, Revised General Statutes, which, limits the time for taking an appeal in chancery.

The application for an order of supersedeas is denied, and the appeal dismissed.

Taylor, G. J., and Ellis, J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and West and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion.


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Citator

Cited By (39 total)

  • Emmitt Monroe Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961)
    …ecord, is not to be condemned merely because they appeal to the jury to “perform their public duty” by bringing in a verdict of guilty. The prosecutors in the instant case remained within the bounds of the evidence. Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605. In actuality, there is probably very little that the prosecutors themselves could have advanced which would have been any more damning of the conduct of this appellant than the gruesome evidence which [*732] was presented from the witness stand. Ga…
  • Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2008)
    …e of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation. State v. Williams, 198 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1967) (quoting Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605, 608 (1923), wherein a declaration emanating two minutes after a shooting was admitted); see also Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (applying a four-pronged test: the statement must be the natural emanation or outgrowth of th…
    1 / 2
  • Henderson v. State, 94 Fla. 318 (Fla. 1927)
    …nguished gentlemen who uttered them. The use of inflammatory language by State’s counsel in the prosecution of persons charged with crime is most unfortunate. Pearce v. State, 112 So. 83, 93 Fla. 504. In the case of Washington v. State 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605, where the lines of demarcation between legitimate and improper argument are pointed out, it was well said by this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell : “The prosecuting attorney occupies a semi-judicial position. He is a sworn officer of th…

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