CHARLES DESOUZA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
CRAFTON DESOUZA AND JEAN DESOUZA, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
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Charles DeSouza appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims for repayment of five alleged interest-free loans to family members based on the statute of limitations. The court affirmed the dismissal of four loans but reversed as to the fifth, holding that a family relationship alone does not extend the statute of limitations but that a factual question remained regarding whether the fifth payment constituted a loan.
A family relationship standing alone does not establish special circumstances sufficient to extend the statute of limitations for demanding payment of loans. Summary judgment was properly entered for the first four loans as they fell outside the limitations period. However, a factual question exists regarding whether the March 26, 1992 payment for real property taxes constituted a loan, so summary judgment was improper as to that payment.
[1] A family relationship, standing alone, does not establish special circumstances that extend the time to demand payment of a debt beyond the statute of limitations.
[2] When a demand or other act is a condition precedent to the right to sue, the demand must be made within a reasonable time, typically analogous to the statute of limitatio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that a family relationship standing alone does not establish special circumstances as contemplated in Stoudenmire.”
Establishes the core holding that family relationships do not automatically extend the statute of limitations for loan demands
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCharles DeSouza claimed he made five interest-free loans to Crafton and Jean DeSouza over a six-year period (May 1986 through March 1992), ranging fro…
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DELL, Judge.
Charles DeSouza appeals the trial court’s order granting Crafton and Jean DeSouza’s (appellees) motion for summary judgment-based on the statute of limitations. He contends that special circumstances extended the time to demand payment of five alleged “loans” to appellees. Appellees cross-appeal the denial of their motion for attorney’s fees. We affirm the summary judgment as to the first four loans, and reverse and remand as to the fifth loan. We affirm the denial of attorney’s fees.
Appellant claims that he made five interest free loans to appellees over a six year period:
May 15,1986 — $ 4,000.00
July 26,1990 — $13,700.00
September 4,1990 — $15,900.00
January 9,1991 — $ 6,000.00
March 26,1992 — $ 2,478.01
On May 10, 1995, appellant made a written demand for payment. Appellees refused to pay.
In Stoudenmire v. Florida Loan Co., 117 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), the First District adopted the rule provided in Smith v. Middle States Utilities Co., 228 Iowa 686, 293 N.W. 59 (1940): Stoudenmire, 117 So. 2d at 502 (quoting Smith, 293 N.W. at 64). Appellant contends that’ special circumstances extended his time to demand payment beyond the four year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(k), Florida Statutes (1995). He argues for the first time on appeal that the existence of a family relationship extended his time to make a demand for payment. Even if we accepted appellant’s argument that this issue was before the trial court, we must affirm the summary judgment as it applies to the loans on May 16, 1986; July 26, 1990; September 4, 1990; and January 9, 1991. Appellant does not explain, nor does the record show, how the family relationship between the parties affected the time for making a demand for payment. We hold that a family relationship standing alone does not establish special circumstances as contemplated in Stoudenmire. “[Wjhere a demand or some other act is required of a plaintiff as a condition precedent to his right to sue, the demand must be made in a reasonable time, and this time, unless there be some special circumstances shown, will be fixed in analogy to the statute of limitations.” However, a question of fact remains as' to whether appellant’s payment of real property taxes on March 26, 1992, constituted a loan to appellees. Since appellant timely filed his action to collect the payment made on this date, we reverse the summary judgment as to that payment.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Anderson v. Mosher, 758 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…. We held that under those circumstances the demand for repayment must be made in a reasonable time analogous to the statute of limitations, and, as to the loans in which the demand was beyond that period, the claims were barred. DeSouza v. DeSouza, 708 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The creditor argues that we should follow Mason v. Yarmus, 483 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), which also involved an oral loan to be repaid on demand. Although there was no written instrument, the second district relied on Unif…
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Mosher v. Anderson, 817 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2002)…contracts. With regard to oral loans that do not contain repayment terms, both the First District Court of Appeal and the Fourth District have concluded that the cause of action accrues at the time the loan was entered into. See DeSouza v. DeSouza, 708 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Stoudenmire v. Florida Loan Co., 117 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).2 This is consistent [*817] with the common law rule applicable to written payable-on-demand notes. See Ruhl, 390 So. 2d at 356; Syerson, 40 So. 2d at 782.3 Th…
Authorities Cited
- Stoudenmire v. Fla. Loan Co., Inc., 117 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)