WAYNE BEATON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Wayne Beaton appeals his conviction for burglary while armed and wearing a mask, grand theft, and dealing in stolen property. The court reverses on two grounds: the trial court abused its discretion by denying Beaton's request to represent himself without making a proper Faretta inquiry, and his convictions for both theft and dealing in the same stolen goods violate double jeopardy.
The court reversed the denial of self-representation because the trial judge based his decision on Beaton's competence to represent himself rather than his competence to waive counsel, and failed to create a proper record satisfying Faretta requirements. The court also reversed the convictions for both theft and dealing in stolen property as violating double jeopardy under section 812.025, Florida Statutes.
[1] Convictions for both dealing in stolen property and grand theft violate double jeopardy when the convictions arise in connection with one scheme or course of conduct.
[2] A defendant may not be sentenced for both dealing in stolen property and grand theft when both charges stem from a single scheme or course of conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An accused has the right to self-representation so long as the right to the assistance of counsel is knowingly and intelligently waived.”
Establishes the fundamental right to self-representation and the requirement that it be a knowing and intelligent waiver.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBeaton was convicted of burglary while armed and wearing a mask, grand theft, and four counts of dealing in stolen property. During trial, Beaton requ…
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POLEN, Judge.
Appellant Wayne Beaton appeals his conviction of burglary while armed and wearing a mask, grand theft, and four counts of dealing in stolen property. Among his five points raised, he alleges the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself and in convicting him of both theft and dealing in the same stolen goods. We agree and reverse accordingly as to both these points.
An accused has the right to self-representation so long as the right to the assistance of counsel is knowingly and intelligently waived. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In this regard, the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry into the defendant’s capacity to make an intelligent and understanding waiver. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.111(d) (1995). The court is not required to inquire into the defendant’s competence to represent himself. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (quoted in Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 265, 139 L.Ed.2d 191 (1997)).
While we believe the better practice is for trial judges to make a formal inquiry under Faretta before concluding that the defendant is not competent to waive his right to counsel, we acknowledge that, often, as in this case, a judge’s familiarity with a particular defendant may prompt him to conclude that that defendant is not competent to waive that right. Notwithstanding such familiarity, Faretta still requires the judge to make a sufficient record that indicates how the defendant’s background, including his age, mental status, and education, affects his competency to waive his right to counsel.
Here, the record reflects that the trial judge was familiar with Beaton because of other cases in which Beaton had appeared before him. Based on this familiarity, the judge summarily concluded that, due to Bea-ton’s overall lack of knowledge of trial procedure, he would not receive a fair trial if he were allowed to represent himself. As the judge based his decision on Beaton’s competence to represent himself, as opposed to his competence to waive his right to counsel, and failed to lay a proper record to satisfy Faret-ta, we find that denial of Beaton’s request was an abuse of discretion. See State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 865, 139 L.Ed.2d 763, 66 U.S.L.W. 3473 (1998); Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d at 905.
We also reverse based on Beaton’s conviction for both theft and dealing in the same stolen goods. As the state properly concedes, his conviction on both charges violates double jeopardy under section 812.025, Florida Statutes (1995).
We reject Beaton’s argument, however, that the trial court should have suppressed his confession based on the failure of the officers in question to have reread his Miranda rights before questioning him about the burglary of the victim below.1 Although he waived his rights after he was initially stopped, albeit for a different crime than that with which he was charged below, lie contends the officers were required to readvise him of his rights once their line of questioning changed. We disagree, since Miranda does not require that, “after effective waiver, each individual questioning the defendant during a single continuing session of interrogation must, prior to asking any questions, readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights.” Enriquez v. State, 449 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.1990).
As to the other points raised on appeal, we affirm.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
STONE, C.J., and GUNTHER, J., concur. . Beaton has raised this argument numerous times in his six appeals before this court. We have already rejected this argument twice in case numbers DN 97-0726 and DN 97-0725.
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Flowers v. State, 976 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…ity to observe the defendant’s demeanor and ability to express himself. The trial court, however, did not expressly rely on any of those reasons in finding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was freely and voluntarily given. See Beaton v. State, 709 So. 2d 172, 173-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that, notwithstanding its familiarity with a particular defendant, Faretta requires that a trial court make a sufficient record that indicates how the defendant’s background, including his age, mental status, and…
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Langon v. State, 791 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…th a defendant, Faretta still requires the trial court to make a sufficient record indicating how the defendant’s background, including his age, mental status, and education, affects his competency to waive his right to counsel. See Beaton v. State, 709 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA), cause dismissed, 718 So. 2d 166 (Fla.1998); see also Wilson v. State, 724 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Mitchell v. State, 407 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). However, here, as in Waterhouse, the defendant’s competency to waive wa…
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Edenfield v. State, 45 So. 3d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…d. 268 (1942). . Brown v. State, 971 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“The test is not whether the defendant is competent to represent himself adequately, but whether he is competent to make the decision to represent himself"); Beaton v. State, 709 So. 2d 172, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). . 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla.1997). . Id. at 251 quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. . Id. (emphasis added). . Potts v. State, 718 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla.1998); see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S.Ct. 137…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993)
- Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990)
- State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997)
- Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996)
- Enriquez v. State, 449 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)