RUFUS YOUNG, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 5th DCA | 1998-04-09
No. 98-686
GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ. concur.
709 So. 2d 614 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Rufus Young, appearing for the eighth time before this court, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus seeking a belated appeal of his 1990 burglary, grand theft, and drug paraphernalia conviction. The court denied the petition, finding it barred by laches and as a successive and abusive collateral attack, and prohibited further pro se filings on the subject conviction.


Holding

Young's habeas corpus petition is denied as barred by the doctrine of laches and as a successive petition constituting an abuse of process. The court prohibits Young from filing any further pro se pleadings concerning his 1990 convictions and warns that additional successive collateral attacks will result in forfeiture of gain time.


Headnotes

[1] A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be barred by the doctrine of laches.

[2] A successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus constitutes an abuse of process.

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Key Quotes

“Even Herman Melville had to come to an ending in Moby Dick”

The court's colorful articulation of the principle that repeated litigation must eventually conclude, justifying the bar against successive collateral attacks.

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Facts & Procedural History

Young was tried and convicted in 1990 of burglary of a dwelling, grand theft, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced as a habitual fel…

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Opinion of the Court
DAUKSCH, Judge.

DAUKSCH, Judge.

In his eighth appearance in this court on this case, Rufus Young petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he is entitled to a belated appeal. He is wrong. Young was tried and convicted in 1990 of burglary of a' dwelling, grand theft, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced as an habitual felony offender to thirty years incarceration. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed various post-conviction appeals in this court.1

In his latest document, Young petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming entitlement to a belated appeal by raising both old and new legal grounds. First of all, his petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. McCray v. State, 699 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.1997). Second, his petition is successive and an abuse of process. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 680 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“Even Herman Melville had to come to an ending in Moby Dick”); Isley v. State, 652 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (bar of successive claims applies equally to habeas petitions). We therefore prohibit Young from filing any further pro se pleadings with this court concerning his 1990 convictions and admonish him that additional successive collateral attacks will expose him to forfeiture of gain time. See Davis v. State, 705 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 703 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Rooney v. State, 699 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Hall v. State, 698 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); O'Brien v. State, 689 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 697 So. 2d 511 (Fla.1997).

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DENIED.

GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ. concur. . Young v. State, 580 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (direct appeal); Young v. State, 585 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (denial of 3.850 motion affirmed without prejudice since appeal was pending); Young v. State, 597 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (denial of second 3.850 motion affirmed); Young v. State, 621 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (denial of habeas corpus petition affirmed); Young v. State, No. 96-1339 (Fla. 5th DCA July 1, 1996) [unpublished order] (voluntary dismissal of appeal of order denying defendant’s post-conviction motion); Young v. State, 684 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (denial of 3.850 motion affirmed); Young v. State, 708 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (denial of 3.800(a) motion affirmed).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Olsen v. Olsen, 964 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
    …e of employment, but his earning capacity exceeded hers; accordingly, the court ordered him to pay permanent periodic alimony of $450 monthly. This court affirmed the alimony and equitable distribution portions of the final judgment. Olsen v. Olsen, 709 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). In 2002, the Former Wife filed motions for contempt and enforcement, which resulted in an order finding the Former Husband to be delinquent and in contempt. They settled the arrearages through March 2004, but Former Husband con…
  • Hough v. State, 773 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …The unwarranted filings of such delayed claims unnecessarily clog the trial and appellate court dockets and constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. Id. at 1368. See Davis v. State, 705 So. 2d 133, 134, n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Young v. State, 709 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). We caution Hough against filing additional successive and time-barred petitions and motions for collateral relief. See Edwards v. State, 760 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (court has the inherent authority to ban a defendant fr…

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