LAWRENCE L. MORSE, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY L. MORSE, APPELLEE
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THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge.
Lawrence L. Morse, the husband in this marital dissolution case, challenges a final order, which he contends erroneously denies his motion to set aside a mediated settlement agreement and improperly awards the wife, Mary L. Morse, attorney’s fees relative to his motion. We affirm the denial of the motion without discussion. We decline to review the trial court’s determination on the issue of attorney’s fees, however, as the order merely establishes the wife’s entitlement thereto and does not otherwise set the amount of the fees. See Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The husband’s challenge to fees is therefore dismissed, because that portion of the order which addresses fees is nonfinal and nonappealable. See id.
Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs.
FULMER, J., concurs specially with an opinion in which ALTENBERND, J., concurs.
FULMER, Judge,
concurring.
While I concur with the majority opinion, I write to comment on the issue of attorney’s fees. I agree that we have no jurisdiction to address the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the wife until such time as the amount is determined. Nevertheless, on the record before this court, it is difficult to discern a basis for the award. The wife’s motion requested that fees be awarded as a sanction. However, the trial court made no findings to support the award of fees as a sanction. I do not question the proposition that fees may be awarded as a sanction where warranted, and I realize there is no statutory requirement that the trial court make written findings in order to award fees as a sanction. Nevertheless, findings of fact may serve to complete the record where entitlement is not otherwise apparent.
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- Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)