MICHELLE M. NEWSOME, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RACHELLE MAE AGUIAR, APPELLANT,
v.
MAX JOSEPH HAFFNER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a dismissal of a negligence per se claim against a social host for allowing minors to consume alcohol at a residence party, holding that Florida's "open house party" statute creates a civil cause of action for social host liability. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the minor's self-inflicted gunshot wound was too remote a consequence to allow the claim to proceed.
A complaint stating facts sufficient to establish a violation of § 856.015 alleges a valid cause of action for negligence per se, as the statute creates a duty of care on social hosts and is designed to protect minors from harm resulting from alcohol or drug consumption. The claim should not be dismissed on the basis that the chain of events resulting in injury was improbable; foreseeability and proximate cause issues should be resolved by the jury based on the specific factual details of the case.
[1] A violation of Florida Statutes § 856.015, the "open house party" statute, can form the basis for a negligence per se claim against a social host.
[2] A penal statute designed to protect a class of persons against a particular type of harm creates a civil cause of action for negligence per se when violated.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a cause of action in negligence per se is created when a penal statute is designed to protect a class of persons, of which the plaintiff is a member, against a particular type of harm”
Establishes the legal standard for when a statutory violation creates a civil cause of action for negligence per se
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRachelle Mae Aguiar, a minor, was at an open house party at the residence controlled by Max Joseph Haffner. Alcoholic beverages were consumed at the r…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Social Host Liability cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges a final judgment by which a complaint was dismissed with prejudice, upon a determination that it failed to state a cause of action. We conclude that the complaint should not have been dismissed in its entirety, as a sufficient claim was made for social host liability under a theory of negligence per se, based on an alleged violation of § 856.015, Florida Statutes.
Commonly known as the “open house party” statute, section 856.015 provides, at subsection (2), that:
No adult having control of any residence shall allow an open house party to take place at said residence if any alcoholic beverage or drug is possessed or consumed at said residence by any minor where the adult knows that an alcoholic beverage or drug is in the possession of or being consumed by a minor at said residence and where the adult fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug.
The statute makes a violation of this provision a criminal offense, and is clearly designed to protect minors from the harm that could result from the consumption of alcohol or drugs by those who are too immature to appreciate the potential consequences. The statute is thus similar to the enactment involved in Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla.1963), wherein a cause of action in negligence per se was predicated on a violation of a statute which made it a criminal offense to permit a minor to possess or consume alcoholic beverages on certain licensed premises.
Section 856.015 extends such criminal responsibility to a social host at a residence with an open house party. Al though a corresponding civil liability was not previously recognized at common law, see Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla.1987), a cause of action in negligence per se is created when a penal statute is designed to protect a class of persons, of which the plaintiff is a member, against a particular type of harm. See Davis; Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1959), approving Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); Tampa Shipbuilding and Engineering v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419, 181 So. 403 (Fla.1938); J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. of Olustee v. Richardson, 105 Fla. 204, 141 So. 133 (1932).
By enacting section 856.015, the legislature has therefore imposed a duty of care on social hosts and created a civil cause of action for a statutory violation.
The appellant’s complaint contains sufficient allegations to support such a cause of action, even though the harm which ultimately resulted was occasioned by the minor’s self-inflicted gunshot wound. The appellee’s contention that this was a freakish and improbable chain of events outside the ambit of probable cause does not justify dismissal of the complaint. In McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1992), the supreme court acknowledged that the trial court might remove such an issue from the jury if the events are so extraordinary and utterly unpredictable as to be entirely unforeseeable, but the court further cautioned that foreseeability in the proximate cause context depends on the specific and narrow factual details of the case. Because the specific and narrow factual details of the present case are not yet fully revealed, the issue of whether proximate cause may exist as a matter of law should not now be resolved. See, e.g., Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
The appealed order is reversed as to the dismissal of the claim for social host liability. The order is otherwise affirmed, and the case is remanded.
BARFIELD, C.J., and LAWRENCE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Abril v. Dep't OF Corr., 884 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…rcumstances where violation of statutory duty will give rise to tort liability); Golden Shoreline Ltd. v. McGowan, 787 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (discussing types of negligence per se that may arise from statutory violation); Newsome v. Haffher, 710 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (stating that “a cause of action in negligence per se is created when a penal statute is designed to protect a class of persons, of which the plaintiff is a member, against a particular type of harm”). The circumstances in…
-
Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High Sch., Inc. v. Maynoldi, 30 So. 3d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…the possession or consumption of the alcoholic beverage or drug. § 856.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). At the time of the off-campus party attended by Gabriel, the application of this criminal provision was well settled. See, e.g., Newsome v. Haffher, 710 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (describing the purpose and effect of the statute); Trainor v. Estate of Hansen, 740 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (adult host set up kegs of beer outside his home for consumption by minor guests at his daughter’s 16th birthday,…
-
Trainor v. Est. OF David Hansen, 740 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…en house parties, is a criminal statute creating no civil penalty and/or liability, and therefore, Count II must be dismissed with prejudice as well.” At the time the trial court entered its order, it did not have the benefit of Newsome v. Haffner, 710 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 722 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1998). In Newsome, the First District recognized a civil cause of action for social host liability under a theory of negligence per se based on an alleged violation of section 856.015. The court in…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCAIN v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992)
- J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. of Olustee v. Richardson, 105 Fla. 204 (Fla. 1932)
- Tampa Shipbuilding & Eng'g Corp. v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 (Fla. 1938)
- Tamiami GUN Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959)
- Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987)
- Auflick v. Louie L. Wainwright, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963)
- Tamiami GUN Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)