PHYLLIS COLE, F/K/A PHYLLIS KEHOE, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES KEHOE, JR., A/K/A CHARLES F. KEHOE, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1998-05-06
No. 97-2186
POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
710 So. 2d 705 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 28 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A divorced wife appeals an attorney's charging lien imposed in her former attorney's favor, arguing the lien's scope is impermissibly broad. The court agrees that a charging lien cannot attach to property outside the suit or property acquired after the attorney's services, and cannot secure fees incurred in enforcing the lien itself.


Holding

A charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit or not before the court, cannot attach to property the client did not own when the attorney rendered services, and cannot be used to secure fees incurred in enforcing the lien itself.


Headnotes

[1] An attorney's charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in a suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particu…

[2] An attorney's charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court.

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Key Quotes

“The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.”

Establishes the fundamental definition and limitation of a charging lien to the particular suit and its recoveries

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Facts & Procedural History

In a divorce proceeding, the wife's former attorney Jack Ackerman obtained an order imposing a charging lien on the wife's undivided interest in all r…

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Opinion of the Court
STEVENSON, Judge.

STEVENSON, Judge.

The wife in this divorce proceeding appeals an order imposing an attorney’s charging lien in favor of her former attorney, .Jack Acker-man, upon her “undivided interest ... in any and all real property, tangible and intangible personal property, and any and all other assets that are presently, or shall become” her property. The appellant contends that the scope of the lien is too broad in that it encompasses property outside the subject litigation and secures attorney’s fees incurred by Ackerman to enforce the lien. We agree on both counts.

“The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.” Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla.1983). By definition, an attorney’s charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court. Here, the appealed order does not limit itself to property put before the court by virtue of the dissolution action and even purports to allow a lien upon property that the wife did not own at the time of the suit and the rendition of the attorney’s services. Neither category of property is properly the subject of an attorney’s charging lien. See Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v. Mascola, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D744, D746, — So. 2d — (Fla. 4th DCA March 18, 1998) (stating that charging lien could not attach where no money or identifiable property was recovered in the subject litigation); Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517 So. 2d 88, 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“[T]he services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services.”).

For the same reasons, the charging lien may not be used to secure fees incurred by the wife’s former attorney in enforcing his lien. The actions of the attorneys hired to enforce the lien did nothing to contribute to the dissolution action and the resulting “fruits” reaped by the wife. In fact, it can fairly be said that the proceeding to enforce the charging lien was adverse to the wife’s interests.

Accordingly, although we affirm the order to the extent that it imposes a charging lien, we remand and instruct the trial court to eliminate from the lien the $1,080 charged by Ackerman’s lawyers for their enforcement efforts and to modify the order to reflect that the lien is only upon those items of property before the court in the dissolution action.

AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED.

POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (15 total)

  • Roberta Santini, M.D. v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 65 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …v. Ric-Man Int’l, Inc., 31 So. 3d 308, 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Erroneous Limitation of Final Judgment Amount “By definition, an attorney’s charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court.” Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a p…
  • Rudd v. Rudd, 960 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
    …witness fees incurred in perfecting and enforcing the lien. “The charging lien is an equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in the suit secured to him in the judgment or recovery in that particular suit.” Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(quoting Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla.1983)). “It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the…
  • Franz Edward Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …fforts did not produce a positive result and, therefore, that the trial court erred in granting a charging lien. Mr. Mitchell cites to several cases that discuss the imposition of charging liens and the proper scope of such liens. See Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (concluding that the appealed order was too broad because it was not limited to the property that was involved in the dissolution action and because it purported to allow a lien on other property that the wife did not own at…

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