SUSAN GAYLE STATON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH FRANK STATON, APPELLEE
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Susan Staton appealed a divorce judgment that distributed marital assets unequally and denied her permanent alimony. The appellate court reversed because the trial court failed to provide the statutory findings of fact required by Florida law to justify the asset distribution and alimony denial.
The trial court's judgment was legally deficient and must be reversed and remanded. The court failed to provide the specific written findings of fact required by Florida Statutes section 61.075(3) identifying and valuing marital assets and distinguishing non-marital assets, and failed to provide findings supporting the denial of permanent alimony as required by section 61.08.
[1] A trial court must provide specific written findings of fact identifying and valuing marital assets and clearly identifying non-marital assets when distributing marital p…
[2] A trial court must justify an unequal distribution of marital assets based on all relevant factors, including those enumerated in section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes.
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Establishes the mandatory statutory requirement for findings in equitable distribution cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSusan and Joseph Staton were married for 31 years. Susan had started the couple's businesses using inherited monies. A temporary restraining order fro…
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
Susan Gayle Staton appeals the final judgment entered dissolving her marriage to her husband, Joseph Frank Staton. She contends that the final judgment, which distributed assets and denied her permanent alimony, is legally deficient because it fails to set forth factual findings as required by chapter 61, Florida Statutes (1995). We agree and reverse.
Initially, we review various facets of the equitable distribution award. The Florida legislature has mandated that when the trial court distributes the marital assets, it must provide specific written findings of fact identifying and assigning a value to marital assets, and giving a clear identification of non-marital assets. See § 61.075(3). The final judgment dated October 6, 1996 lacks these required statutory findings.
This lack of findings complicates review of the equitable distribution order in a further way. Athough the trial court may distribute marital assets unequally, the trial court is required to justify such an award based on “all relevant factors,” nine of which are specifically enumerated in section 61.075(1). Here, the wife received an unequal portion of the asset distribution. The final judgment fails to set forth the findings necessary to support the unequal award. In the absence of such findings, which serve to advise the reviewing court of the trial court’s rationale, see section 61.075(3)(d), we are unable to determine why the wife, who started the current businesses with inherited monies, received less than the husband, and whether this was equitable.
The final equitable distribution issue pertains to the time between November 8, 1994, and March 11, 1995, when a temporary restraining order prohibited the wife from coming on the premises of either business because the husband had, at that time, the exclusive right to operate and manage each store. On remand, the wife is entitled to pursue an accounting of the proceeds of each store during the period of exclusive operation by the husband.
The final issue is the denial of permanent alimony for the wife. In paragraph four of the final judgment that dissolved this thirty-one year marriage, the wife was awarded rehabilitative alimony. This paragraph was superseded by a subsequent order of the court that effectively removed an award of alimony of any type. In a long term marriage süeh as this one, there is an initial presumption that permanent alimony is proper. Compare Burrill v. Burrill, 701 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (no such presumption arises for sixteen year marriage which is in grey area). A trial court is required to include findings of fact relative to the factors to consider in awarding or denying alimony. See § 61.08(1) and (2). These statutorily required findings of fact to support the trial court’s denial of alimony are not set forth in either the final judgment or in the order on motion for rehearing. The failure to do so is error. See Thompson v. Thompson, 658 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995).
We reverse the final judgment and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate statutory findings.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J. concur.
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Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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Perrin v. Perrin, 795 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…ial court erred in denying her request for alimony and attorney’s fees without making any findings of fact. A trial court is required to include the relative findings of fact that were considered in awarding or denying alimony. See Staton v. Staton, 710 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Likewise, a trial court cannot decide the issue of attorney’s fees without findings as to one spouse’s ability to pay fees and the other spouse’s need to have fees paid. See [*1025] Schlafke v. Schlafke, 755 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 4th…
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Feger v. Feger, 850 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…is rehabilitation program.. ALIMONY Section 61.08 authorizes a trial court to award permanent alimony. In doing so, a trial court is required to consider the factors set forth in section 61.08(2) and to make findings of fact. See Staton v. Staton, 710 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In its order on rehearing the trial court considered the significant alteration of the parties’ relationship caused by Mr. Feger’s stroke and his precipitous and mysterious relocation, as well as the number of years of inta…
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Cleary v. Maria Tereza De Castelo Branco Ferreira Cleary, 872 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…n-marital assets. See § 61.075(3) (requiring [*302] that “any distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence”); see also Staton v. Staton, 710 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). However, before a trial court can make these determinations, it must establish a cut-off date, in accordance with section 61.075(6), for determining whether assets and liabilities should be classified as marital. See § 61.075(6)…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chapoteau v. Jean-Rene Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Chastain v. Scandinavian Health Spas & Am. States Ins., 659 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Burrill v. Burrill, 701 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Thompson v. Thompson, 658 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)