DAN D. WHETSTONE, APPELLANT,
v.
CYNTHIA G. WHETSTONE, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1998-05-27
No. 97-2136
GROSS, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
710 So. 2d 749 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

The court affirmed a trial court's order granting temporary suspension of alimony and child support payments due to the husband's job loss, but refusing to make the relief retroactive to the motion filing date. The decision clarifies that trial courts have broad discretion in granting temporary support relief based on temporary changes in circumstances.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying retroactive application of the temporary relief. Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding temporary relief, and it is appropriate to grant such relief based on temporary changes in circumstances without retroactive effect.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has broad discretion in awarding temporary relief from support obligations, and appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with such awards.

[2] Temporary relief from support obligations may be granted based on a temporary change in circumstances.

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Key Quotes

“temporary relief awards are among the areas where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, which appellate courts are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of circumstances”

Establishes the high level of deference given to trial court discretion in temporary relief decisions

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties divorced in 1996, with a final judgment requiring the husband to pay $500 monthly alimony and $1,742 child support while earning approxima…

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Opinion of the Court
STONE, Chief Judge.

STONE, Chief Judge.

We affirm an order temporarily staying a final judgment of dissolution. Husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to make the order retroactive to the date of the filing of his motion.

The parties divorced in 1996. The final judgment of dissolution required Husband to pay Wife $500 in alimony and $1,742 in child support each month. At that time, Husband earned approximately $72,000 a year. In January of 1997, Husband’s job with the school board was eliminated. He filed a “Motion to Suspend or Reduce Alimony and Child Support,” requesting a temporary change in the support obligation for three months or until he became re-employed.

The trial court was not in a position to rule on the motion until April. In its order, the trial court found that Husband was making diligent efforts to obtain employment and anticipated having a job, with a comparable salary, by July 31st. The court concluded that Husband lacked the present ability to pay and was entitled to temporary relief for three months, including May, June, and July. The court denied Husband’s request to make the relief retroactive.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not retroactively suspending and reducing support. See Pedraja v. Garcia, 667 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“It is a very basic appellate truism that temporary relief awards are among the areas where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, which appellate courts are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of circumstances.”). We also recognize that it is not an abuse of discretion to grant temporary relief based on a temporary change in circumstances. See Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Manning v. Manning, 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); McConnell v. McConnell, 552 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Abdella v. Abdella, 693 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Bennett v. Department of Rev., 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). This type of relief differs from a permanent modification, which requires the showing of a permanent change in circumstances. See Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla.1992).

GROSS, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Rahn v. Rahn, 768 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …argues that his loss of employment was permanent and involuntary under the “good faith test.” The “good faith test” has been applied to allow for temporary relief from alimony based on a temporary change in circumstances. See Whetstone v. Whetstone, 710 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“This type of relief differs from a permanent modification, which requires the showing of a permanent change in circumstances.”). See also Kinne v. Kinne, 599 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); McConnell v. McConnell, 552 So. 2…
  • Dervishi v. Dervishi, 905 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …e reduced to be more commensurate with his current ability to pay.” Kinne, 599 So. 2d at 194. “This type of relief differs from a permanent modification, which requires the showing of a permanent change in circumstances.” See Whetstone v. Whetstone, 710 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Here, the trial court found the former husband had sustained a temporary, involuntary, substantial change in his financial circumstances warranting a monthly reduction in alimony of $1,285.71. The court explicitly found th…
  • Dannie Anthony Austin v. Lilliam M. Fernandez, 898 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
    …a temporary reduction or suspension in alimony when the obligor has suffered a reduction in income without deliberately seeking to avoid paying alimony and is acting in good faith to return his income to its previous level); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 710 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(The “good faith test” has been applied to allow for temporary relief from alimony based on a temporary change in circumstances.). Austin is entitled to a temporary downward modification in his monthly alimony obligation, su…

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