JOHN DAVIS WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1998-05-27
No. 97-2497
Per Curiam
710 So. 2d 1029 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial because the prosecutor's improper personal attacks on the defendant—calling him "repulsive," claiming he "has the face of a liar," and making derogatory comparisons—violated the defendant's right to a fair trial.


Holding

Prosecutor's personal attacks and offensive characterizations of a defendant during trial constitute reversible error requiring a new trial.


Headnotes

[1] It is improper for a prosecutor to apply offensive epithets, personal attacks, or vituperative characterizations to a defendant during trial, and such conduct requires re…

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Key Quotes

“Because our system treats persons on their own individual merits, it is always wrong to call witnesses or defendants names by citing them as examples of a criminal 'type'”

Court citing Perez v. State for the principle that personal attacks on defendants are fundamentally incompatible with fair trial principles.

Facts & Procedural History

The defendant was convicted after trial where the prosecutor described him as "repulsive," argued he "has the face of a liar," made derogatory comment…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s comments. The prosecutor described the defendant as “repulsive”, and argued to the jury that he “has the face of a liar” and that he treated his wife like a dog. When she cross examined defendant, the prosecutor derogatorily compared him to an aetor/used car salesman in the movie “Cadillac Man.”

These comments were entirely improper. They were offensive to any notion of a fair trial and require reversal. See Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“Because our system treats persons on their own individual merits, it is always wrong to call witnesses or defendants names by citing them as examples of a criminal ‘type’ ”); Duque v. State, 498 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Green v. State, 427 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA) (“It is improper in the prosecution of persons charged with a crime for the representative of the state to apply offensive epithets to defendants or their witnesses, and to engage in vituperative characterizations of them.”), review denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983); Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1231-32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1980).

We find no merit in the evidentiary points on appeal.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gomez v. State, 751 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
    …ts not in evidence, urged the jury it was their duty to convict, referred to defendant in pejorative terms). We also note that this same prosecutor, Laura Stuzin, was recently admonished for similar improper comments during trial in Walker v. State, 710 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998),2 which resulted in this Court’s reversal of that defendant’s conviction. It is not solely the prosecutor who must be admonished here. The trial court retains the ultimate responsibility for the proper conduct of trial counsel an…
  • State v. Wichmann, 726 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …nded, after a conviction for drunk driving. We cannot say that the limited deprivation here requires even more constitutional protection than the permanent takings involved in Real Property and Lamar. 660 So. 2d at 1119. See also State v. McKnight, 710 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Having concluded that the issue was not properly before the trial court for consideration and that the court should have found [*383] the statute constitutional in any event, we decline to answer the certified question and reve…

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