DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND CINDY SICKLES, PETITIONERS,
v.
RANDALL BYRD, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 1998-05-27
No. 97-4613
BARFIELD, C.J., and JOANOS, J., concur.
710 So. 2d 1036 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal quashed a trial court order compelling DNA testing to determine paternity seven years after a 1990 default paternity judgment had already established the respondent as the legal father. The court held that once paternity has been adjudged, it cannot be relitigated without an allegation of extrinsic fraud.


Holding

No. Once paternity has been adjudged, that issue cannot be relitigated absent an allegation of extrinsic fraud. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting the motion to compel DNA testing without addressing whether extrinsic fraud existed.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court departs from the essential requirements of law by ordering DNA testing to determine paternity seven years after a default final judgment of paternity has be…

[2] A prior paternity judgment cannot be relitigated absent an allegation of extrinsic fraud committed on the court during the original proceedings.

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Key Quotes

“the issue of the child's paternity had already been determined in the 1990 paternity judgment. That issue cannot be relitigated at this point absent some allegation of extrinsic fraud committed on the trial court during those proceedings.”

Establishes the core holding that adjudged paternity cannot be relitigated without extrinsic fraud.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1990, respondent was adjudged the legal father of a minor child pursuant to a default final judgment of paternity. In September 1997, seven years l…

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Opinion of the Court
WOLF, Judge.

WOLF, Judge.

Petitioners argue that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by directing respondent, petitioner Sickles, and their minor child to undergo DNA testing to determine the child’s paternity seven years after respondent had already been adjudged the legal father of the child. We agree and quash the trial court’s order compelling the DNA tests, with directions that respondent’s motion to compel the tests be denied.

In 1990, respondent was adjudged the legal father of the minor child pursuant to a default final judgment of paternity.

In September 1997, he filed a motion to compel blood tests alleging only that he had a reasonable basis to believe that he may not be the child’s father, arguing that section 742.12(1), Florida Statutes, mandated such tests in a paternity action on the request of a party and that the statute set forth no time limit for requesting such tests. Respondent did not, however, seek to have the 1990 paternity judgment vacated or set aside. At a hearing on the motion, respondent testified that he had been advised during petitioner Sickles’ pregnancy that he may not have been the child’s father, but that he had done nothing with the information until he noticed that the child looked nothing like him.

The trial court granted respondent’s motion and directed the parties to submit to DNA testing to determine the paternity of the child, but the court did not vacate or set aside the 1990 paternity judgment.

In entering the order under review, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, potentially causing irreparable harm to the petitioners,, because the issue of the child’s paternity had already been determined in the 1990 paternity judgment. That issue cannot be relitigated at this point absent some allegation of extrinsic fraud committed on the trial court during those proceedings. See Department of Revenue v. Harris, 684 So. 2d 231, 232-33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Day, 615 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Morgan v. Morgan, 466 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

At most, respondent’s testimony at the hearing on his motion to compel the tests could establish only a claim of intrinsic fraud, which could only have been brought within one year of the entry of the 1990 paternity judgment. See Harris, supra.

We, therefore, quash the trial court’s order directing respondent, petitioner Sickles, and their minor child to undergo DNA testing to determine the child’s paternity. We direct the trial court to deny respondent’s motion to compel the tests.

BARFIELD, C.J., and JOANOS, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Southwick v. State, 750 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …edy on appeal and that certiorari jurisdiction was established. See Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see also L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Department of Revenue v. Byrd, 710 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We grant the petition for certiorari, quash the order of the trial court mandating additional testing, and direct the trial court to dismiss this paternity action with prejudice. See § 742(4), Fla.Stat. (1997). THREADGIL…
  • Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …b) (2004). The former husband argues, and we agree, that his action is essentially an attempt to set aside the dissolution decree’s paternity and child support obligations for fraud on the court, i.e., extrinsic fraud. See Dep’t. of Revenue v. Byrd, 710 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (stating that seven year old paternity judgment could be set aside only on ground of extrinsic fraud); State Dep’t. of Revenue v. Harris, 684 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (stating that in the paternity context the only way…

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