IKE SCOTT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Scott appeals his conviction for cocaine and drug paraphernalia possession, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The appellate court affirmed, finding the initial traffic stop was lawful based on a defective turn signal, and the K-9 unit's alert provided probable cause for the search.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, holding that the officer lawfully stopped Scott's vehicle based on the non-functioning turn signal under Florida Statute § 316.610(1), and that no evidence supported Scott's claim that the stop was unreasonably prolonged.
[1] A traffic stop is lawful when an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.
[2] A K-9 unit's alert on a vehicle can establish probable cause to search the vehicle.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An officer's decision to stop an automobile is legal when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”
Establishes the legal standard for traffic stops, citing Whren v. United States
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWhile driving, Scott was stopped by an Ocala police officer who observed his car's turn signal was not functioning. While the officer was writing a ci…
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ANTOON, Judge.
Ike Scott (defendant) appeals his judgments and sentences which were entered by the trial court after he pled nolo contendere to the charges of possession of cocaine1 and possession of drug paraphernalia.2 Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress contraband seized during a traffic stop. We disagree because probable cause to search both defendant and his vehicle arose during a lawful traffic stop. Accordingly, we affirm.
While driving his patrol car, an Ocala police officer observed defendant driving his Chevrolet automobile. The officer signaled for defendant to stop his car because the car’s turn signal failed to flash. While the officer was writing the traffic citation, a K-9 unit arrived. When the dog alerted on defendant’s car, the officer advised defendant that he had probable cause to search the car. After the officer told defendant to put his hands on the car, the dog alerted on defendant. A subsequent search of defendant and his car disclosed cocaine both in defendant’s pocket and on the driver’s seat of the car. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing the officer did not have probable cause to stop his car and the subsequent searches of his car and his person were illegal because the stop was unduly prolonged before the K-9 unit arrived. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that neither of these contentions possessed merit. We agree.
An officer’s decision to stop an automobile is legal when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Here, the trial court determined that the officer’s testimony that the turn signal on defendant’s car was not operating properly was credible. As a result of this finding, it was proper for the court to rule that the officer had probable cause to stop defendant’s car pursuant to section 316.610(1), Florida Statute (1995), which authorizes police officers to stop any vehicle that has equipment not in proper adjustment or repair.3 Although defendant testified that his turn signal was working, it was the trial court’s responsibility to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. See Dooley v. State, 501 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
As for the defendant’s argument that the stop was unreasonably prolonged, no testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing to support this argument. Instead, the testimony presented by the state established that the K-9 unit arrived before the officer had an opportunity to present the citation to defendant for his signature. See Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla.1990) (traffic stop must last no longer than the time it takes to write the citation).
Finding no merit in the defendant’s claims of error, we affirm his judgments and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. . §§ 893.03(2)(a)4; 893.13(6)(a) Fla. Stat. (1995).
. § 893.147, Fla. Stat. (1995).
. See also §§ 316.215; 316.222; 316.234, Fla. Stat. (1995).
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State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…“Regardless of the individual officer’s motivation, the traffic stop was lawful because the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated the traffic code by driving a vehicle with an expired temporary tag.”); Scott v. State, 710 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Here Rhodes [*974] testified without dispute that the trailer’s taillights were inoperative and that the trailer did not have a license plate. Section 316.610, Florida Statutes (1999) provides that it is a violation to drive a v…
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Tristan Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…raffic infraction); State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that stop of appellee’s car was clearly lawful where car was pulling a trailer that had no taillights or license plate in violation of section 316.610); Scott v. State, 710 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (concluding that, officer had probable cause to stop appellant’s car pursuant to [*159] section 316.610(1) where turn signal on car was not operating properly). We also note that it would not be practical to require a law enforc…
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State v. Perez-Garcia, 917 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…ppel-lee’s car was pulling a trailer that had no taillights or license plate); State v. Snead, 707 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)(holding that a vehicle was properly stopped where a brake light and a tail light were inoperative); Scott v. State, 710 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(concluding that officer had probable cause to stop appellant’s car pursuant to section 316.610(1) where turn signal on car was not operating properly). We are further supported in our conclusion by the fact that most of the provi…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1990)
- Dooley v. State, 501 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)