WILLIAM LAWTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Lawton appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court reversed, holding that a sentence imposed following violation of probation cannot exceed the suspended portion of a true split sentence, and Lawton's 12-year sentence exceeded his exposure limit of 5 years.
A sentence imposed upon violation of supervision that exceeds the suspended portion of a true split sentence is illegal. Lawton's 12-year sentence exceeded his 5-year exposure limit and therefore violated the law. The trial court erred in denying his Rule 3.800(a) motion.
[1] A "true split sentence" includes situations where the entire portion of incarceration is suspended or where the period of supervision imposed is shorter than the suspende…
[2] Upon violation of supervision following a true split sentence, a defendant's exposure to further imprisonment is limited to the suspended portion of the original sentence…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A sentence imposed which exceeds the suspended portion of a true split sentence is illegal.”
Establishes the core legal principle that determines Lawton's sentence violated Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLawton received a 5-year prison sentence suspended with supervision and special conditions. He violated the terms of supervision, and the trial court …
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PER CURIAM.
William Lawton challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse.
After Lawton violated probation, the trial court imposed a sentence of five years’ prison on the counts currently under attack, suspended the incarceration, and placed Lawton on supervision with special conditions. He again violated the terms of supervision, and the trial court imprisoned him for twelve years on those counts. The sentence of five years’ imprisonment, suspended, constitutes a “true split sentence.” See State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1997) (resolving conflicts among the districts and denominating as “true split sentences” both those in which the entire portion of the incarceration is suspended and those in which the period of supervision imposed consumes a shorter period than the suspended portion of the sen tence). Upon violation of his supervision, Lawton’s exposure to a prison sentence was limited to five years. See Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); State v. Carra, 695 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
A sentence imposed which exceeds the suspended portion of a true split sentence is illegal. See Carra, 695 So. 2d at 886; Silva v. State, 602 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Relief is available to aggrieved prisoners from these illegal sentences by means of rule 3.800(a) motions. See Johnson v. State, 641 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); see also Evans v. State, 703 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
The trial court erroneously relied on Lee v. State, 666 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), to deny Lawton relief. In Lee, the trial court, in a proceeding before imposing the challenged prison sentence of twenty-two years, impermissibly placed Lee on probation for twenty-two years after he had violated the terms of supervision in a true split sentence for which he stood exposed to no more than seventeen years’ incarceration or probation. This court rejected his attack on his twenty-two-year prison sentence because he had earlier accepted the benefit of twenty-two years’ supervision when he could have successfully appealed it as exceeding his exposure of only seventeen years upon violation of his true split sentence. The trial court misread Lee by applying it to Lawton’s facts where Law-ton had accepted the benefits of nothing irregular in the prior history of the case.
We reverse for the trial court to revisit Lawton’s motion in light of this opinion. If the trial court cannot append record attachments to a subsequent order denying Lawton relief which refute his claim, resentencing will be required.
Reversed.
FULMER, AC.J., and GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Lawton v. State, 731 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…rocedure 3.800(a). Previously, this court reversed the trial court’s order denying relief and remanded for further proceedings as the record attached to the trial court’s order failed to refute the allegation in Lawton’s motion. See Lawton v. State, 711 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Now, as the State concedes, we are compelled to reverse and remand for resentencing because the trial court’s second order and attachments fail to refute Lawton’s claim that his sentence is illegal. After Lawton violated a proba…
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Stoutamire v. State, 734 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…owing revocation of his community control, those sentences would appear to be prohibited by Poore, requiring that the trial court resentence appellant to terms not exceeding ten years, with credit for any time previously served. See Lawton v. State, 711 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), on appeal following remand, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D847, 731 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions. MINER, J., CONCURS. LAWRENCE, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT OPINION.…
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Chappel v. State, 746 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…n of a ‘true split sentence’ that exceeds the suspended portion of the original sentence”). The sentence imposed by the trial court in this case exceeds the suspended sentence by six months. This sentence is illegal. See Stoutamire; Lawton v. State, 711 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), on appeal following remand, 731 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hopping v. State, 708 So. 2d 263 (Fla.1998). Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing. JOANOS, WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR. . An earlier affidavit…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Powell, 703 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1997)
- LEE v. State, 666 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Gerrard D. Jones v. State, 602 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Silva v. State, 602 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Johnson v. State, 641 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- State v. Carra, 695 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Evans v. State, 703 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)