SUSAN R.S. WERTHEIM, APPELLANT,
v.
MICHAEL S. WERTHEIM, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of the former wife's motion for contempt based on the former husband's sale of his medical practice. The court held that the sale did not violate the marital settlement agreement's requirement that he use best efforts to maximize his W-2 income, and affirmed the denial of attorney's fees given the former wife's substantial financial resources and support obligations.
The trial court's finding that the sale was a stock transaction and not a sale of future income, and that the sale did not violate the best-efforts clause, was supported by substantial competent evidence and properly denied. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees given the former wife's substantial financial resources and the support she receives.
[1] A marital settlement agreement provision waiving a party's claim or interest in a professional association upon payment of a specified sum is enforceable.
[2] A trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence when the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the findings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the sale of the professional association was a stock transaction and ... not a sale of future income”
The court's key characterization of the transaction that distinguished it from prohibited income sales under the marital settlement agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced and entered into a marital settlement agreement. The former husband owned a medical practice organized as a professional ass…
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GROSS, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the former wife’s motion for contempt or for enforcement of the final judgment of dissolution. The trial court made two findings— that “the sale of the professional association was a stock transaction and ... not a sale of future income,” and that the sale of the medical practice (including the related management and service agreement) was not in violation of the provision of the marital settlement agreement that the former husband use his “best efforts to reasonably maximize his professional W-2 income until he reaches his fiftieth birthday.” We find, that there was substantial, competent evidence to support both determinations. Significantly, under the' marital settlement agreement, the former "wife accepted $100,000 for her share of the former husband’s medical practice and agreed that “[u]pon such payment ... [the former wife] shall have no claim or interest in said P.A. whatsoever as a result of marriage or for any other reason.”
We also affirm the denial of the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees under the principles enunciated in Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1997). The former wife receives $48,000 per year in child support and a minimum of $150,000 per year in alimony. When each child becomes emancipated, the $24,000 in child support allocable to that child converts to additional alimony. Her net worth is between $1,000,000 and $1,200,000, of which about $800,000 is attributable to investments. She received' the marital-home pursuant to the settlement agreement; it is worth over $400,000 and is not encumbered by a mortgage. In addition to alimony and child support, the former husband pays for health insurance for the former wife and the children; private school tuition, summer camp expenses, and transportation; all uncovered medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses for the children; a $1,500,000 life insurance policy naming the former wife as irrevocable beneficiary; and the children’s income taxes.
Considering the financial resources of the parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees, even though the former husband has greater assets and a sizeable income. No other “relevant circumstance” identified by Rosen compels us to override the trial court’s decision. 696 So. 2d at 700; cf. Brody v. Poliakoff, 697 So. 2d 933, 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
GLICKSTEIN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Carlson v. Andree Carlson, 719 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…need; it is not enough to simply show that the adverse party’s ability to pay the fees is greater than the party seeking relief or that an award is based on the relative financial strain of paying attorney’s fees. Id; See also Wertheim v. Wertheim, 711 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The hearing before the special master in the present case focused on the parties’ intent with regard to how former husband was to pay former wife $600,000 and whether he could do so with retirement funds that required a Q…
Authorities Cited
- Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)
- Brody v. Poliakoff, 697 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)