RONALD L. EVANS, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
RODNEY B. TAYLOR, APPELLEE
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Homeowners appealed summary judgment dismissing their third-party complaint against a contractor's qualifying agent for unfair and deceptive trade practices and building code violations. The court reversed, holding that Murthy's bar on personal liability under Chapter 489 does not apply to claims under Chapter 501, and that uncontradicted evidence showed the agent personally performed defective work.
Summary judgment for the qualifying agent was improper. Although Murthy bars claims against qualifying agents under Chapter 489, it does not bar claims under Chapter 501 for unfair and deceptive trade practices. Additionally, uncontradicted evidence that the agent personally performed defective work created a factual dispute precluding summary judgment.
[1] A qualifying agent for a contracting company may be held personally liable for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Chapter 501, Florida Statutes, even if Chapter 4…
[2] A party's personal involvement in performing defective work can create individual liability separate from their role as a qualifying agent for a contracting company.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, which is the licensing and regulatory chapter governing construction contracting, does not create a private cause of action against the qualifying agent.”
Establishes the Murthy holding that the homeowners attempted to rely on to bar claims against Taylor
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHomeowners Evans and Snyder contracted with T-Systems, Inc. for hurricane repair work. Rodney Taylor was T-Systems' qualifying agent. When the homeown…
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PER CURIAM.
Ronald Evans and Barbee Snyder, homeowners, appeal from an order of final summary judgment entered in favor of Rodney Taylor, the third party defendant. For the following reasons, we reverse.
The homeowners contracted with T-Systems, Inc. for repairs to be done on their residence following Hurricane Andrew. Rodney Taylor is the qualifying agent for T-Systems. T-Systems sued the homeowners for breach of contract and foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien. The homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that the contractor’s work was improper and incomplete. The homeowners then filed a third party complaint against Rodney Taylor individually, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices under Chapter 501, Florida Statutes; violation of the building code; and unjust enrichment.
Taylor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that as the qualifying agent for T-Systems, he could not be held personally liable for purely economic losses. Taylor’s motion relied primarily on Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1994). In Murthy, the supreme court held that Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, which is the licensing and regulatory chapter governing construction contracting, does not create a private cause of action against the qualifying agent. Id. at 986. In opposition to Taylor’s motion for summary judgment, Ronald Evans filed an affidavit in which he averred that Taylor not only acted as the qualifying agent for T-Systems and supervised the work done on his residence, but that “Taylor himself undertook repairs to [the] residence which were defective and not in compliance with applicable building codes.” Taylor filed no counter affidavit. The trial court granted Taylor’s motion, citing Murthy.
The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Taylor, as the action is not barred by Murthy. In this case, unlike the plaintiffs in Murthy, the homeowners did not seek relief against the qualifying agent pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes; they sought relief under Chapter 501 for unfair and deceptive trade practices. Furthermore, Evans’ uncontradicted affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment indicates that the homeowners sued Taylor not only because he was T-Systems’ qualifying agent, but also because he himself had performed work on the project.
Reversed and remanded for further consistent proceedings.
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Clark H. Scherer, III v. The Villas del Verde Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 55 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…remedies against a qualifying agent, it does not expressly provide for a civil cause of action”; reversing judgment against qualifying agent of corporation, which was liable for damages because it failed to pay kitchen contractor); Evans v. Taylor, 711 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding Murthy inapplicable to case where homeowners sued qualifying agent “because he himself had performed work on the project”). We note that, in the same year that Murthy was decided, the legislature amended chapter 489…
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Gen. Prop. Constr. Co. v. Empire Off., Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2019)…J.) (“nothing in Murthy stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may assert a common law claim where Plaintiff has not alleged any injury that would exist independent of the purported statutory violations.”); but see, Evans v. Taylor, 711 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (reversing the dismissal of the qualified agent because he “himself undertook repairs to the residence which were defective and not in compliance” and the injury was not solely based on his statutory duty). The proposed a…
Authorities Cited
- Melendez v. Singletary, 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994)