TRAVIS DEMETRIS HICKS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1998-06-17
No. 97-2855
Before COPE, GERSTEN and SORONDO, JJ.
711 So. 2d 1366 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Travis Hicks appeals his probation revocation sentence, arguing that his cocaine possession with intent to sell charge should have been scored at severity level four rather than level five on Florida's offense severity ranking chart. The court affirmed the sentence, holding that the statutory offense number controls the chart classification, not the descriptive column.


Holding

The offense is properly classified at level five under Fla. Stat. § 921.0012. The numerical statutory listing in the chart controls over the descriptive column; therefore, possession with intent to sell or deliver is included within the level five ranking for that statutory violation. The argument regarding the wrong scoresheet was procedurally barred due to lack of preservation.


Headnotes

[1] When applying an offense severity ranking chart, the numerical statutory listing is controlling over the descriptive column in the event of inconsistency.

[2] Possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver is a level five offense under the statutory offense severity ranking chart.

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Key Quotes

“The ranking chart is intended to be applied by statute number, with the "description" column serving as an aid to reference. In the event of inconsistency, the numerical statutory listing is, in our view, controlling.”

Establishes the controlling principle that statutory number rather than description determines offense severity level classification.

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Facts & Procedural History

Hicks pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)1. He was placed on probat…

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, Judge.

COPE, Judge.

Travis Demetris Hicks appeals his sentence imposed after revocation of probation. We affirm.

Defendant-appellant Hicks pled nolo con-tendere to the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes. He was placed on probation, which was revoked in 1997. He appeals the sentence imposed, claiming scoresheet error. Defendant contends that his violation of section 893.13(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes, should have been scored at level four, rather than level five, on the statutory offense severity ranking chart. We disagree. Under the applicable chart, a violation of section 893.13(1)(a)1 is a level five offense. See § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994).1

Defendant points out that the column labeled “description” in the statutory chart describes a violation of section 893.13(1)(a)1 as “[s]ell, manufacture, or deliver co-caine_” § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. He argues that since the “description” column does not mention possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, it follows that the Legislature intended to exclude possession with intent to sell or deliver from the level five ranking. If that analysis is correct, then defendant would be entitled to the level four ranking for otherwise unclassified second degree felonies. See § 921.0013(2), Fla. Stat. (1993).

We reject defendant’s argument on this point. The ranking chart is intended to be applied by statute number, with the “description” column serving as an aid to reference. In the event of inconsistency, the numerical statutory listing is, in our view, controlling. It is illogical to believe that in creating an exhaustive listing like the offense severity ranking chart, the Legislature would include part of an offense— sale, manufacture, or delivery of cocaine— and simultaneously leave unmentioned the remainder of the same statutory offense— possession of cocaine with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver it. See § 893.13(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (1993).2

As his second point on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court used the wrong scoresheet. Because this argument was not presented to the trial court at sentencing, or by postsentencing motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), it is not preserved for appellate review and we do not consider it. See § 924.051, Fla. Stat. (1997).3 As the State concedes that defendant’s point is well taken, our ruling is without prejudice to the defendant to seek postconviction relief.

Affirmed.

. This statute applies because defendant committed the crime on February 22, 1995.

. For offenses committed on or after October 1, 1996, the offense severity ranking chart has been amended to say that, "For purposes of determining which felony offenses are specifically listed in the offense severity ranking chart and which severity level has been assigned to each of these offenses, the numerical statutory references in the left column of the chart and the felony degree designations in the middle column of the chart are controlling; the language in the right column of the chart is provided solely for descriptive purposes.” § 921.0012(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996); ch. 96-388, § 51, at 2340-41, Laws of Fla. .This was a 1997 sentencing to which section 924.051, Florida Statutes, was applicable.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Torres v. State, 715 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …ate, 689 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). However, our affirmance is without prejudice to the defendant to seek posteonviction relief. See State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla.1998); Young v. State, 716 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Hicks v. State, 711 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Ellis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Affirmed.…
  • Williams v. State, 779 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …de the manner in which he was charged with committing the offense. We reject Williams’ argument. The descriptive portion of section 921.0012 is intended as an aid in reference only; the numerical statutory listing is controlling. See Hicks v. State, 711 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We remand for reconsideration of the sentence, however, because the offense was committed in February 1996. See Smith v. State, 761 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Conviction affirmed; sentenced remanded. FULMER, A.C.J…

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