JOHN YOUNG, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this appeal of a second-degree murder conviction, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed Young's conviction because the trial court improperly modified the standard Allen charge (jury deadlock instruction) by omitting language about declaring a mistrial and instead telling the jury it would be discharged for the evening, which created coercive pressure to reach a verdict.
The trial court's modification of the Allen charge constituted reversible error. The omission of the final sentence of the standard instruction and the substitution of language implying the jury must reach a verdict violated the requirement that Allen charges avoid coercive deadlines, threats, pressure on minority views, and any implication of a false duty to decide. The State failed to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so the conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
[1] Modifying the standard Allen charge by omitting the final sentence, which advises the jury that the case will be declared a mistrial if a verdict cannot be reached, const…
[2] A trial court must avoid coercive deadlines, threats of marathon deliberations, pressure for the surrender of conscientiously held minority views, and any implication of…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In giving an Allen charge, a trial court must avoid: '(1) coercive deadlines, (2) threats of marathon deliberations, (3) pressure for the surrender of conscientiously held minority views, and (4) any implication of a false duty to decide.'”
Establishes the four key principles that must be followed when giving an Allen charge to avoid reversible error
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung was convicted of second-degree murder. During trial, after approximately four hours of deliberations, the jury reported it could not agree on a …
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BLUE, Judge.
In this appeal of his second-degree murder conviction, John Young, Jr., contends the trial court erred when it modified the Allen
charge. We agree the modified instruction was improper. Because the State failed to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
The jury began its deliberations in this case near 5:00 p.m. on the second day of trial. At or near 9:00 p.m., it informed the court, “As a group we cannot agree on a verdict.” The trial judge made the decision to give the jury an Allen charge. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Grim.) 3.06. It is proper for a trial judge in a criminal ease to give the standard Allen charge when it appears the jury is deadlocked. The trial judge also decided, however, that he did not want a mistrial that night and would bring the jury back the next morning if it could not reach a verdict. Based on his intent to have the jury return the following morning to complete its deliberations, the trial judge modified the standard instruction, to which defense counsel objected.
The last sentence of Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 3.06 reads: “After you have done that, if you simply cannot reach a verdict, then return to the courtroom and I will declare this case mistried, and will discharge you with my sincere appreciation for your services.” The trial judge omitted this sentence and, instead, substituted the following: “After you have done that, if you simply cannot reach a verdict, then return to the courtroom and I will discharge you for the evening.” The jury then resumed its deliberations and approximately 40 minutes later, returned its verdict.
Because the trial court improperly modified the Allen charge, we reverse. Omitting the last sentence of the standard instruction is error. See McKinney v. State, 640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Inclusion of the omitted sentence, on the other hand, compensates for other deviations from the standard instruction. See McElrath v. State, 516 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In giving an Allen charge, a trial court must avoid: “(1) coercive deadlines, (2) threats of marathon deliberations, (3) pressure for the surrender of conscientiously held minority views, and (4) any implication of a false duty to decide.” Gahley v. State, 567 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (citations omitted). The trial court’s modification of the Allen charge in this case implied all that should be avoided. Any deviation from the standard charge that makes it appear the jury must reach a verdict constitutes reversible error. See Warren v. State, 498 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Because this case is to be remanded for a new trial, the sentencing issue raised by Young is moot. We would suggest, in an abundance of caution, that should Young again be convicted and the trial court determines a departure sentence is appropriate, the written reasons for departure should be filed within seven days of sentencing.
Having determined that the trial court erred in deviating from the standard Allen charge, that Young preserved the error by timely objection, and that the State failed to show the error to be harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FRANK, A.C.J., and LENDERMAN, JOHN C., Associate Judge, concur. . Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1999)…ncerns about interference with a jury’s deliberations and decision. Many Florida courts have held that instructions which exceed the parameters set out in Allen are coercive in nature and constitute fundamental or harmful error. See Young v. State, 711 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (judge’s deviation from Allen charge was error because it gave the appearance that the jury had to render a verdict); Rodriguez v. State, 559 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (judge’s comment to jury that it had been deliberating for…1 / 2
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Monforto v. State, 28 So. 3d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…g an Allen charge, a trial court must avoid: ‘(1) coercive deadlines, (2) threats of marathon deliberations, (3) pressure for the surrender of conscientiously held minority views, and (4) any implication of a false duty to decide.’ ” Young v. State, 711 So. 2d 1379, 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (quoting in part Gahley v. State, 567 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). We find the court’s instruction problematic when considered in the context of this case, where the jurors had voted to stay after 5 p.m. and finish…
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Holder v. State, 233 So. 3d 518 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 976 (Fla. 1999). The court should not set forth “coercive deadlines” and make “threats of marathon deliberations” when giving an Allen charge. Monforto v. State, 28 So. 3d 65, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Young v. State, 711 So. 2d 1379, 1379 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)), And counsel’s failure to object to such an instruction can .constitute ineffective assistance. See Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 66 (Fla. 2001). The postconviction court correctly determined that Holder could not establi…
Authorities Cited
- Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (U.S. 1896)
- Gahley v. State, 567 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- McKINNEY v. State, 640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Morales v. Four Star Poultry & Provision Co., Inc., 498 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Warren v. State, 498 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- McELRATH v. State, 516 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)