MARCUS FIELDS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Marcus Fields appealed his departure sentence for drug offenses, arguing the trial judge improperly deviated from sentencing guidelines based on an alleged escalating pattern of criminal conduct. The appellate court reversed the sentence, finding Fields' drug offenses did not constitute an escalation from his prior violent crimes, and also struck certain improper liens and costs.
The court held that Fields' drug offenses do not constitute an escalating pattern of criminal conduct under Florida law, and therefore the departure sentence was invalid. The court also held that the public defender lien was imposed without proper notice and opportunity to contest, the $80 restitution to the police department was erroneous without documented costs, and certain other costs were improperly imposed.
[1] A departure sentence is invalid if the stated grounds for departure do not fit the statutory definition of an escalating pattern of criminal conduct.
[2] A youthful offender designation does not permit departure from sentencing guidelines without valid written reasons.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The escalating pattern of criminal conduct may be evidenced by a progression from nonviolent to violent crimes, a progression of increasingly violent crimes, or a pattern of increasingly serious criminal activity.”
Establishes the legal standard for finding an escalating pattern under Florida law, which Fields' conduct did not meet.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcus Fields was convicted of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine, sale of marijuana, and possession of marijuana, which included one second degre…
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CASANUEVA, Judge.
Marcus Fields has challenged the sentence imposed upon him for sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine, sale of marijuana, and possession of marijuana. The trial judge departed from the guidelines permitted range of 28.95 to 48.25 months in state prison on the ground that the defendant exhibited an escalating pattern of criminal conduct. Accordingly, she sentenced Fields as a youthful offender to four years in prison followed by two years on probation. Because Fields’ conduct does not fit within the established “escalating” pattern, we reverse his sentence. Furthermore, the court erred in imposing certain liens and costs, which must be stricken.
Expressing frustration with this young defendant at sentencing, the judge noted that Fields had an extensive prior record, consisting of burglaries, obstructing and opposing without violence, batteries, robbery, and concealed firearm charge's. Fields’ current drug offenses, which included one second degree felony, two third degree felonies, and one misdemeanor; do not represent an escalation from his prior conduct. As defined in section 921.001(8), Florida Statutes (1995), “The escalating pattern of criminal conduct may be evidenced by a progression from nonviolent to violent crimes, a progression of increasingly violent crimes, or a pattern of increasingly serious criminal activity.” Furthermore, the designation of Fields as a youthful offender will not support departure from the guidelines without valid written rea sons. See Easton v. State, 687 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Hernandez v. State, 672 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Because the trial judge imposed an invalid departure sentence, the new sentence must be within the guidelines. If the court imposes another youthful offender sentence, the term must be within the statutory maximum for each offense. See § 958.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1995).
In addition to the invalid departure, irregularities occurred in the imposition of costs and liens. The judge announced that she was imposing a public defender lien without stating the amount or notifying the defendant of his opportunity to contest the amount. On remand, Fields must be given thirty days to file a written objection to the amount of the attorney’s fees. If he files an objection, the trial court must strike the attorney’s fees and may impose a new fee provided that the defendant is afforded notice and a hearing. See Gerald v. State, 699 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Halyard v. State, 667 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
The trial court also announced that Fields would be required to pay $80.00 in restitution to the St. Petersburg Police Department within the probationary period. Without a request from the appropriate agency documenting its costs, which is absent here, it was erroneous to require the defendant to pay this cost. This cost must be stricken, but on remand, the State shall have an opportunity to obtain the appropriate documentation under section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes (1995) (renumbered as section 938.27 and amended, effective July 1, 1997). See Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Finally, further court costs of $255.00 were imposed. All are mandatory except for the $2.00 fine, and appropriate statutory authority was cited in the written order. Accordingly, only the $2.00 cost must be stricken.
Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
FRANK, A.C.J., and THREADGILL J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Welch v. State, 724 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…documenting its costs. On remand, the State shall have the opportunity to obtain the appropriate documentation under section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes (1995) (renumbered as section 938.27 and amended, effective July 1, 1997). See Fields v. State, 712 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Affirmed; remanded with directions. NORTHCUTT and GREEN, JJ., Concur.…
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Reeder v. State, 725 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…to file an objection to the amount of the public defender lien. If such an objection is filed within thirty days, the trial court must strike the lien and impose a new lien provided the appellant is afforded notice and hearing. See Fields v. State, 712 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Gerald v. State, 699 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Reversed and remanded. PATTERSON, A.C.J., and WHATLEY and GREEN, JJ., concur.…
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Demond Lamont Alexander v. State, 744 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…v. State, 672 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), we reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing. On remand, the trial court may reimpose the same six-year sentence, provided written reasons for departure are set forth. See Fields v. State, 712 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Hernandez. Additionally, the written sentencing documents should be corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement that appellant receive credit for time served on the charges which formed the basis of his violation…
Authorities Cited
- Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Halyard v. State, 667 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Hernandez v. State, 672 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Gerald v. State, 699 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Easton v. State, 687 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Sikorski v. State, 687 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)