CARL W. HARTLEY, JR., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DOUGLAS M. GUETZLOE, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The trial court's denial of attorney's fees was improper because the closeness of the case is not a valid reason to deny fees when the statutory requirements are met and there is no finding of bad faith.
Appellants sought attorney's fees under section 768.79 after obtaining a judgment significantly greater than their offer of judgment. The trial court …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Offer Of Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Carl W. Hartley and Richard F. Wall appeal the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees after they requested an award pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995). Hartley and Wall obtained a judgment more than 25% greater than the amount demanded in their offer of judgment.
An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory under section 768.79, where the requirements of the statute are met, unless the trial court determines the offer was not made in good faith. TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla.1995); Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Here, there was no finding that the appellants’ offer of judgment was not made in good faith. Instead, the reason for the denial of the motion for attorney’s fees was because the questions of fact and law were extremely close.. We find this an improper basis on which to deny the motion for attorney fees. See Puleo v. Knealing, 654 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (because there has been no finding that appellants’ offer of judgment was not made in good faith, trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs must be reversed, as it improperly applied a “reasonableness of rejection” standard in determining whether the appellants were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79), approved 675 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla.1996).
The appellants’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is also granted. §§ 59.46 & 768.79(1), Fla. Stat: (1995); Williams v. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We reverse and remand so that the trial court can determine the appropriate amount of reasonable attorney’s fees to be assessed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB, GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Motter Roofing, Inc. v. Leibowitz, 833 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…), Florida Statutes (2001), provides for mandatory recovery of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees by a plaintiff who has prevailed upon the merits, providing the plaintiff has complied with the requirements of the statute. See Hartley v. Guetzloe, 712 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). This Court, along with all district courts in Florida, has ruled that Section 768.79 also applies to fees incurred on appeal. See Lantigua v. Lopes, 696 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Mark C. Arnold Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Lumber…
-
Braaksma v. Pratt, 103 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…79(7)(b) to decline to award fees altogether. Id. at 612 (approving district court decision reversing the denial of attorney’s fees under section 768.79 based solely on the reasonableness of the rejection of the offer); see also Hartley v. Guetzloe, 712 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (reversing denial of attorney’s fees under legally sufficient offer of judgment because the trial court denied the motion [*916] based solely on one of the enumerated factors under section 768.79(7)(b)). We recognize that t…
-
Jacobsen v. Trussell, 750 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…as been expressly rejected by this court, as well as the Florida Supreme Court, as a determining factor of “good faith.” Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla.1996); TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla.1995); Hartley v. Guetzloe, 712 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Here, the trial court’s comments that it was not “surprised” that the plaintiffs rejected the defendants’ offers, and that it had anticipated a verdict for the plaintiffs, suggests that the trial court, at least in part, imprope…
Authorities Cited
- TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995)
- Susanne Rae Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996)
- Rondoe Marie Williams v. Jeannine O. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Puleo v. Knealing, 654 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)