JAMES GARFIELD SMITH, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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James Garfield Smith was convicted of assault with intent to maim his wife by striking her in the face and destroying her eye. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the state failed to prove the specific intent to maim required for the offense, as the evidence showed only an impulsive blow during intoxication without evidence of premeditated malicious intent.
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish malicious intent to maim and disfigure. Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense, the mere doing of the act does not raise a presumption of that specific intent, and the burden is on the state to prove affirmatively that the act was done with the requisite specific intent.
“Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense the doing of the act does not raise a presumption that it was done with specific intent.”
Establishes the fundamental rule that the state cannot rely on inference; it must affirmatively prove the required mental state for crimes requiring specific intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn August 10th, Smith, intoxicated from drinking illegal alcohol ('shine'), struck his wife Maud in the face with his fist during an argument, causing…
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Browne, J.
The plaintiff in error was convicted of assaulting his wife, Maud Smith, with his fist and striking out and destroying her right eye, with malicious intent to maim and disfigure her. The evidence is undisputed that on the afternoon of the 10th of August, Smith was intoxicated from drinking shine, and that he and his wife “were fussing and one word brought on another,” and he struck her in the face with his fist, causing an injury to her eye, which necessitated its being removed.
It appears from the record that they had not had any previous quarrels, nor was there any ill feeling between them. Smith paid the doctor’s bills, and for an artificial' eye for her. She made no complaint against him, and they lived together as man and wife from the time of the injury until after his indictment on the 22nd of the following November. ' These facts fail to establish malicious intent on the part of the plaintiff in error to maim and disfigure his wife by putting out and destroying her eye as charged in the indictment, and no evidence was adduced from which such malicious intent could reasonably have been presumed.
The rule is thus stated in Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, p. 331: “Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense the doing of the act does not raise a presumption that it was done with specific intent.” See also People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590, 3 N. E. Rep. 790; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401.
In 16 C. J. 995, we find, “The burden is on the State to prove that the accused had the specific intent involved in the charge, or to show facts from which it may be proved. ’ ’
In Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 South. Rep. 920, the rule is thus stated: “A presumption of a criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of an unlawful act, but the general rule, that if it is proved that the accused committed the unlawful act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, does not apply in the case of crimes like burglary, assault with intent to kill, or rape, for which a specific intent is necessary. Here the burden is on the State to prove affirmatively either by direct or circumstantial evidence that the act was done with the requisite specific intent.
“Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense, the doing of the act does not raise a presumption that it was done with that specific intent.” See Davis v. State, 22 Fla. 633; Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46, 47 South. Rep. 481; Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 South. Rep. 920.
There being no evidence to sustain the verdict, the judgment is reversed.
Taylor, C. J., and Ellis, J., concur. Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell, J., concur in the opinion.
West, J., dissents.
West, J.,
dissenting.
Intent is an element of many crimes. Of necessity, if not confessed, it must be proved by circumstances. The court seems to hold in this case that the act of the accused in paying the doctor’s bill and for an artificial eye for his wife after destroying the natural one, tends to negative malicious intent and to exculpate him. This does not ap-' peal to me as sound. Nor does the fact that there is no evidence that he had previously gone on a similar rampage and knocked out-the other eye, or otherwise maimed her, tend to negative the alleged malicious intent. ' It seems to me that there is not in this record such absence of proof of malicious intent as to require a reversal.
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Citator
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Rebjebian v. State, 44 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1949)…ced upon it when it proves facts, aside from the breaking and entering, from which the intent may be clearly inferred, Simpson v. State, *Page 83 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920, or proves such intent by circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 87 Fla. 502, 100 So. 738. So, if we examine the circumstances surrounding the incident we find that there had been a persistent effort on the part of someone, shortly before the entry, to determine by calling on the telephone whether anyone was in the house. Following that…
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Pottinger v. State, 122 Fla. 405 (Fla. 1936)…case of Hogan v. State, 50 Fla. 86, 39 South. Rep. 464, was one in which the accused was indicted for an attempt to commit rape. The indictment was held to be bad and the conviction of the accused reversed. The case of Smith v. State, 87 Fla. 502, 100 South. Rep. 738, was one in which the accused was charged with assaulting his wife by striking her with his fist and'destroying her right eye with malicious intent to maim and disfigure her. The court held that where a specific intent is required to make an act an…1 / 2
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Donald v. Bauer, 609 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…r falsified official reports in an attempt to avoid reprimand for failure to follow police procedures). However, the state can also prove specific intent by circumstantial evidence. Rebjebian v. State, 44 So. 2d 81, 82-83 (Fla.1949); Smith v. State, 87 Fla. 502, 100 So. 738 (Fla.1924). Where the state attempts to prove its case by circumstantial evidence, the state can survive a motion for judgment of acquittal simply by presenting “competent evidence from which the jury could infer guilt to the exclusion…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292 (Fla. 1921)
- Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46 (Fla. 1908)
- Davis v. State, 22 Fla. 633 (Fla. 1886)