MICHAEL D. SULLIVAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-05-22
No. 96-00570
FRANK, A.C.J., concurs., THREADGILL, J., dissents with opinion.
713 So. 2d 1023 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Sullivan was convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child. The appellate court reversed because the trial court improperly admitted similar fact evidence involving a different victim under different circumstances that lacked the requisite unique characteristics for admissibility.


Holding

The court held that the evidence was not admissible because the incident with Scott did not possess the requisite unique characteristics or striking similarity required under Florida law. The dissimilarities in location, use of pornographic materials, mutual masturbation, and other factors meant the evidence was not probative of the charged offense and was therefore inadmissible.


Headnotes

[1] Similar fact evidence is admissible if it is probative of the crime for which a defendant is being prosecuted and possesses unique characteristics that set it apart from…

[2] Similar fact evidence must be "not only strikingly similar" to the charged offense but must also possess some "unique characteristic or combination of characteristics whi…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, this kind of evidence must be 'not only strikingly similar' but must also possess some 'unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets [it] apart from other offenses.'”

Establishes the strict standard for admitting similar fact evidence in Florida law.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Sullivan, who met a twelve-year-old victim (Brad) through church activities, exposed his genitals and masturbated in front of Brad in a church restroo…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
CASANUEVA, Judge.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

A jury convicted Michael D. Sullivan of the crime of commission of a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child under sixteen years of age. At trial, over Mr. Sullivan’s objection, the trial court admitted similar fact evidence of other crimes or acts. Because the circumstances of the similar fact evidence were not uniquely characteristic of the facts of the charged criminal conduct, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for a new trial.

The twelve-year-old victim, Brad, and his family became acquainted with Mr. Sullivan through church activities and a friendship developed. The offense occurred in a church restroom. While Brad was using a urinal, Mr. Sullivan entered the room and stationed himself at a nearby urinal. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Sullivan stepped back from the urinal, turned toward Brad, and began to stroke his penis with his hand. Brad observed this conduct and left the restroom as Mr. Sullivan continued this activity. Later, outside the restroom, Mr. Sullivan told Brad that he would “get him” if Brad said anything about what transpired.

In support of its case, the State sought to admit the testimony of Scott. He, too, met Mr. Sullivan through church, where Mr. Sullivan became friendly with Scott and his family. At trial-Scott testified, over objection, that when he was fifteen years of age Mr. Sullivan took him to his apartment. While there Mr. Sullivan played pornographic films, offered him alcoholic beverages, and masturbated “simultaneously and then, by himself and vice versa.”

Our analysis of the admissibility of this alleged similar fact evidence begins with the standards set out by the supreme court in Ruffin v. State, 397 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1981), receded, from on other grounds by Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137 (Fla.1988).

Any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible even if it points to a separate crime, unless its admissibility is otherwise precluded by law. This type of evidence requires cautious scrutiny. To be admissible, it must be probative of the crime for which a defendant is being prosecuted. Id. at 279-280. To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, this kind of evidence must be “not only strikingly similar” but must also possess some “unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets [it] apart from other offenses.” Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987).

The facts of the incident with Scott do not possess the requisite strict similarity for admissibility, and because this is not a custodial or familial situation, more relaxed standards do not apply. See Saffor v. State, 660 So. 2d 668 (Fla.1995). The incidents are different in at least four significant areas. The dissimilarities include: (1) the location of the conduct, i.e., the church restroom as compared to a private apartment; (2) the use of the pornographic films in the one circumstance but not the other; (3) the masturbation by the youth in the incident with Scott but not with Brad; and (4) the act of mutual contemporaneous masturbation in the similar fact instance.

Thus, the incident with Scott is not uniquely factually characteristic of the incident with Brad and, therefore, is not probative of the instant criminal charge.

Accordingly, the events with Scott are not admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995); see Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959):

Because the evidence did not meet the similarity requirement and its admission was prejudicial to Mr. Sullivan’s right to a fair trial, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

FRANK, A.C.J., concurs.

THREADGILL, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent
THREADGILL, Judge,

THREADGILL, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The appellant, in each of the incidents in question, met a young male victim through the child’s mother at church activities. On each occasion, the appellant initiated masturbation in the victim’s presence — with Brad at a church restroom, and with Scott at the appellant’s apartment. Although the incident with Scott at the apartment involved more egregious conduct as outlined in the majority opinion, this additional conduct does not negate the other unique similarities in the incidents. I think the evidence concerning Scott was relevant Williams Rule evidence and properly admitted in this case. I would affirm.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Farrill v. State, 759 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …e differences than similarities between the charged and collateral offenses. Consequently, the trial court should not have admitted C.R.’s testimony in M.W.’s trial. See Saffor; Corpus v. State, 718 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Sullivan v. State, 713 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Gutierrez v. State, 705 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Moore. Finally, we note that the assistant state attorney emphasized the propensity aspect of the Williams rule testimony in closing arguments with such comments as, ‘Where…
  • Corpus v. State, 718 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …efore, it was not probative of the charge for which Corpus was being tried. Consequently, evidence of Z.H.’s encounter with Corpus was not admissible under section 90.404(2), Florida Statutes (1995). See Saffor, 660 So. 2d at 671; Sullivan v. State, 713 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We cannot conclude that the admission of the similar act evidence could not have affected the verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). Therefore, the error cannot be considered harmless, and we must reverse for…
  • Sullivan v. State, 728 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
    …91(0 to warrant extending the time to try Sullivan. We therefore grant the relief requested, and direct the trial court to discharge Sullivan. This court previously reversed Sullivan’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. See Sullivan v. State, 713 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(m), the State was required to try Sullivan within ninety days. The trial court set Sullivan’s case for trial on the eighty-fifth day. Four days before trial, the State filed a…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw