ROGENA TOWNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1998-06-05
No. 97-3425
Orfinger, M., Cobb, Goshorn
713 So. 2d 1030 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1998) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant's conviction for cocaine possession was affirmed where the officer's warrantless search of her shirt pocket was valid because consent was not withdrawn and the plain feel doctrine applied.


Holding

Consent to search was not withdrawn where appellant only placed her hand lightly over the officer's hand without verbal objection, and the search was valid under the plain feel doctrine.


Headnotes

[1] Consent to a search is not withdrawn by a suspect's light hand placement over an officer's hand without verbal objection, and the plain feel doctrine may validate a searc…

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Facts & Procedural History

After a traffic stop, appellant gave permission to search her vehicle and person. When a female officer reached into appellant's shirt pocket, appella…

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge.

ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge.

Appellant pled nolo contendere to a charge of possession of cocaine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. After a traffic stop, appellant gave the officer permission to search her vehicle and her person. When the female officer reached into appellant’s shirt pocket, appellant placed her hand over the officer’s hand, described by the officer as a light touch, but gave no verbal indication she wanted the search stopped. By this time, however, the officer testified she felt an object in the pocket which she immediately recognized by touch as a form of crack cocaine commonly used in the area, based on her experience in the field and prior arrests she had made.

The trial court denied the motion on the ground the consent had not been withdrawn. The determination of whether the consent to search is voluntary is a question for the trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is clearly erroneous. Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264 (Fla.1992). Appellant did not grab the officer’s hand. Cf. Jimenez v. State, 643 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Neither did she say she wanted the officer to stop. In any event, the officer testified she felt the object in the pocket before the hand touched hers, and knew it was “crack.” She testified as to her experience and expertise in the field, and appellant did not produce any evidence challenging her qualifications. Thus the search could have been found valid under the “plain feel” doctrine. See State v. Burns, 698 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

AFFIRMED.

COBB and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …at consent was freely and voluntarily given.”). “The determination of whether the consent to search is voluntary is a question for the trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is clearly erroneous.” Towner v. State, 713 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264 (Fla.1992)). Based on the testimony presented by the State, the trial court specifically found that Kindle freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his vehicle. Our review of th…
  • Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …d to a search voluntarily or merely acquiesced because of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. See Davis v. State, 594 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.1992); Towner v. State, 713 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also United States v. Worley, 193 F. 3d 380, 384 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Consequently, an appellate court should not overturn a trial…
  • P.W. v. State, 965 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
    …argued that he was unlawfully stopped and seized because the officer’s show of authority made him feel that he was not free to leave. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that it was a consensual encounter. [*1199] Towner v. State, 713 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (“The determination of whether the consent to search is voluntary is a question for the trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is clearly erroneous.”). There are three levels of encounte…

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