ANNETTE WIMBUSH, APPELLANT,
v.
JESSIE P. GADDIS AND MICHAEL R. GADDIS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEES
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A slip-and-fall case involving an employee injured on a ramp at leased commercial property. The court reversed summary judgment for the property-owning lessors, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defects in the ramp's elevation and surface—distinct from maintenance obligations—caused the injury.
Summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the ramp had structural problems with its elevation and surface separate from routine maintenance obligations, and whether those defects caused the plaintiff's injury. While lessors are not liable for injuries caused solely by lessee operations, they may be liable for latent dangerous conditions known or reasonably should have been known at the time of lease delivery.
[1] A property owner is not an insurer of the safety of persons on the property, nor is the owner subject to strict liability for injuries.
[2] The crux of a premises liability claim is the failure of the possessor of the premises to exercise due care, not merely ownership.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A lessor may be liable in tort to third persons for injuries resulting from latent dangerous conditions of which the lessor (owner) knew, or should have known, existed on the leased premises when the lessor (owner) delivered possession without appropriate warnings.”
Establishes the core principle that lessors retain liability for pre-existing structural defects despite having transferred possession to the lessee.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnnette Wimbush, an employee of Airocar, Inc., slipped and fell on a ramp located on property owned by Jessie P. and Michael R. Gaddis but leased to A…
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BRYAN, BEN L., Associate Judge.
This ease results from a slip and fall by the appellant, Annette Wimbush, on property owned by the appellees, Jessie P. Gaddis and Michael R. Gaddis, and leased to Airocar, Inc., a corporation apparently owned by appellees. Wimbush was an employee. She did not sue her employer. She sued the property owners alleging that the ramp on which she fell was slippery, had no handrails, was of insufficient size and slope, and improperly discharged into the parking lot. The Gaddises defended, saying they had surrendered possession and control of the premises upon leasing it, and lacked knowledge of any dangerous condition of the ramp. The Gaddises moved for summary judgment, asserting that they neither constructed the ramp nor were responsible for its maintenance. Wimbush filed an affidavit from a purported expert opining that the ramp’s slope, elevation and surface violated county codes. She also asserted that there had been earlier slip and falls and that the Gaddises had knowledge of the ramp’s condition. The trial court granted summary judgment.
An owner of real property is neither an insurer of the safety of persons on the property nor subject to strict liability for injuries. The crux of a cause of action for premises liability is not ownership, but failure of the possessor of the premises to use due care. A lessor may be liable in tort to third persons for injuries resulting from latent dangerous conditions of which the lessor (owner) knew, or should have known, existed on the leased premises when the lessor (owner) delivered possession without appropriate warnings. Such liability is not based on the fact that the lessor is the owner, but because the owner, as possessor, can be negligent in those particulars just as any other possessor. The lessor is not liable for injuries caused solely by the lessee’s operations and activities on the leased premises. Bovis v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 505 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
The lease provided that the lessee is responsible for all routine maintenance and repairs necessary to maintain the premises in good and safe condition. The lessor is “responsible for all other repairs to the roof and structure.” The lessor had a right of entry and inspection. While the Gaddises were not responsible for the day-to-day operations, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were problems with the elevation and surface of the ramp, apart from general maintenance concerns, and, whether those problems resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. These issues preclude summary judgment for the Gaddises in the action brought by Wimbush against them. The summary judgment for the lessor is reversed and the cause remanded for trial.
WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Cold Storage CAFÉ, Inc. v. Barone, 779 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ntained safety glass instead of plate glass, is an unresolved issue of fact. The issue of whether a negligent condition exists on premises generally involves, as here, a disputed material fact which precludes summary judgment. See Wimbush v. Gaddis, 713 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Bryant v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 577 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of appellee Mr. Sollner and remand for further proceedings. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA,…
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Smith v. Grove Apts., LLC, 976 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…onably safe condition, and to give invitees warning of any latent and concealed perils on the premises. See Smith v. Mayes, 851 So. 2d 785, 787-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). As to these duties, our courts treat them the same. See, e.g., Wimbush v. Gaddis, 713 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that "[a]n owner of real property [here a landlord] is neither an insurer of the safety of persons on the property nor subject to strict liability for injuries.”). . The applicability of this case falls within the categ…
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Nita Haines v. Dania Corner, Inc., 920 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…7 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing Bovis v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 505 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)). In this case, the evidence was undisputed that the landlord maintained no control over the interior of the premises. This case is unlike Wimbush v. Gaddis, 713 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), relied upon by Haines. There, the injury occurred on a slippery ramp which led from the premises to the parking lot. The plaintiff came forward with evidence that the ramp was not constructed to code. The written lease made the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bovis v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 505 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)