MARK JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mark Jones was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer after a jury trial, but the Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court erred in denying the defense's request for a jury instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense. The court held that such an instruction is mandatory when requested, even if the evidence shows the lesser offense could not be committed without committing the greater offense.
The trial court's denial of the requested battery instruction was reversible error. The court held that such an instruction is mandatory when requested in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer, and that the issue is preserved for appellate review by a timely specific request without requiring further objection.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error by denying a defense request for a jury instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement…
[2] A request for a jury instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense is preserved for appellate review even if defense counsel does not explicitly state that the req…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the giving of the battery charge is mandatory, when requested, in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer, even though the evidence incontrovertibly shows that the necessarily lesser included offense could not have been committed without also committing the greater charged offense”
Establishes the core holding from State v. Wimberly that battery instructions must be given when requested, regardless of whether the lesser offense could logically exist without the greater offense.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones, an inmate at Century Correctional Institution, was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting a correctional officer with …
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PER CURIAM.
The single issue on appeal in this case is whether the trial court reversibly erred in denying defense counsel’s request for an instruction on battery as a lesser included offense of the charge of battery on a law enforcement officer. We agree that denial of the requested instruction was reversible error, and reverse the conviction of battery on a law enforcement officer. Appellant, Mark Jones, was charged with one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, and on a second count with resisting a correctional officer with violence. He was convicted by a jury of the Count One offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, and of the lesser included offense of resisting without violence on Count Two.1
The incident giving rise to the charges arose when two officers at Century Correctional Institution were attempting to remove Jones, an inmate, from a shower stall where he had been placed for the purpose of taking a shower, which Jones had refused to do. At trial, Jones’ testimony that he acted in self-defense was obviously rejected by the jury, as evidenced by the verdict of guilty as charged on Count One, and of the lesser offense on Count Two. No issue is raised on appeal with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support both convictions.
At the charge conference below counsel for appellant requested an instruction on the offense of simple battery as a lesser included offense of the crime charged — battery on a law enforcement officer. The trial court denied this request, commenting that “[t]here’s no issue at all that there was anyone acting outside the scope of authority, nothing of the sort. He [the officer] was in uniform.” Defense counsel did not further object to the failure to give the battery instruction when the jury was charged.
The facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in State v. Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929 (Fla.1986) as they pertain to the failure to give the battery instruction. The court in Wimberly, answering this court’s certified question, held that the giving of the battery charge is mandatory, when requested, in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer, even though the evidence incontrovertibly shows that the necessarily lesser included offense could not have been committed without also committing the greater charged offense. While conceding the effect of the holding in Wimberly, the state nevertheless questions whether defense counsel preserved the issue by simply requesting the battery charge, without expressly informing the court that the defense was claiming the right to the instruction as a necessarily lesser included offense. This court in Gainer v. State, 633 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), found the issue preserved where the defense requested an instruction on the lesser included offense without informing the court that the lesser offense was necessarily included. See also Holland v. State, 634 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), in which the majority held that failure to instruct on the next immediate lesser included offense, one step removed from the offense of conviction, constitutes reversible error, thus implicitly rejecting the contention that a mere request for a lesser included offense instruction is not preserved for review where counsel fails to inform the court that the requested instruction covers a necessarily lesser included offense.
Finally, the question of whether the denial of a timely specific request for a jury instruction is preserved for appellate review absent a further objection to the failure to give the instruction was addressed by the court in State v. Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1983), the court holding that further objection is not required for preservation.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the conviction as to Count One and remand for a new trial on the offense charged in that count.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN and ALLEN, JJ., and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur. . No error is asserted with respect to the conviction on Count Two.
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Citator
Cited By
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King v. State, 911 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…included lesser offense. See State v. Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929 (Fla.1986). Simple battery is a necessarily lesser included offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. See e.g., Brown v. State, 608 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Jones v. State, 714 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “[E]ven where the evidence is undisputed that the victim is a law enforcement officer, the simple battery instruction must be given so as not to deprive the jury of its pardon power.” Williams v. State, 611 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 1…
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Wong v. State, 184 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (describing defense counsel’s argument in support of the requested instructions as “modest”); Rodriguez v. State, 789 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“It was enough to simply request the battery charge.”); Jones v. State, 714 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that defense counsel’s request for an instruction on simple battery in a prosecution for battery on a law enforcement officer was sufficient even though defense counsel failed to inform the trial court that battery…
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Rodriguez v. State, 789 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…early understood the request and just as clearly [*515] denied the request,” the issue is sufficiently preserved for appellate review. State v. Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955 (Fla.1983). It was enough to simply request the battery charge. Jones v. State, 714 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).1 For the reasons discussed above, we reverse Rodriguez’s conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and remand the case for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SHARP, W. and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . The facts o…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1983)
- Holland v. State, 634 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Schwartz Monzell Gainer v. State, 633 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)