VIRGINIA ELECTRONICS AND LIGHTING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
GEORGE KOESTER, RICHARD HUNT AND TRANSLIGHT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS
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Virginia Electronics sought certiorari review of a trial court's discovery order denying its protective order motion regarding alleged trade secrets. The appellate court quashed the order because it failed to specify what trade secrets existed or provide findings of fact supporting why disclosure was reasonably necessary, making appellate review impossible.
The court held that the trial court's order constituted a material departure from the essential requirements of law because it failed to specify what trade secrets existed and to provide findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure was reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for certiorari and quashed the order.
[1] A trial court order ruling on a motion for a protective order concerning trade secrets is subject to certiorari review when it constitutes a material departure from the e…
[2] An order requiring disclosure of trade secrets is deficient if it fails to specify what trade secrets exist.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“because the order fails to specify what trade secrets exist and to set forth findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets is reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute, it constitutes a material departure from the essential requirements of law”
This quote establishes the essential legal standard that trial courts must follow when ruling on protective orders claiming trade secret protection.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVirginia Electronics filed a complaint against Koester, Hunt, and Translight Corporation seeking injunctive relief under a confidentiality agreement a…
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WEBSTER, Judge.
Petitioner seeks review by certiorari of an order ruling on its motion for a protective' order regarding certain discovery requested by respondents, which petitioner claimed would require it to divulge trade secrets. We have jurisdiction. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (granting a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order requiring responses to an overly broad discovery request).
We conclude that, because the order fails to specify what trade secrets exist and to set forth findings of fact support ing a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets is reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute, it constitutes a material departure from the essential requirements of law.
Accordingly, we grant the petition, and quash the order. Petitioner filed a two-count complaint against respondents, seeking an injunction to enforce a confidentiality, nondisclosure and nonuse agreement and an injunction and damages pursuant to chapter 688, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Respondents served a request for production and interrogatories. Petitioner filed a motion for a protective order, claiming that the discovery requested would require it to divulge trade secrets. Following a hearing, the trial court entered its order granting petitioner’s motion in part, and denying it in part. In its petition to this court, petitioner claims that much of the information which the trial court’s order will require it to produce involves trade secrets.
Petitioner argues that the trial court’s order is deficient because it fails to specify what trade secrets exist and to set forth findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets is reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute.
We agree.
In Eastern Cement Corp. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 512 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), we reversed two non-final agency orders which had denied in part the appellant’s request for a protective order based on the claim that disclosure of the documents sought by the appellee would require it to divulge trade secrets. Our decision was based in part upon the holding that the challenged order was deficient because it failed to specify what trade secrets existed and to set forth findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets was reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. Accord Arthur Finnieston, Inc. v. Pratt, 673 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Absent such information in the trial court’s order, intelligent appellate review is impossible.
We conclude that the order ruling on petitioner’s motion for a protective order constitutes a material departure from the essential requirements of law. Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and quash the order. If the trial court again concludes that some of the information which petitioner claims constitutes trade secrets should be divulged to respondents, it shall comply with the procedure outlined in this opinion.
PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.
BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur.
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Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Maximo Guzman Cabrera, 112 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…e, the trial court is to then make a determination of reasonable necessity and, if it so finds, it is to supply the findings in support of its determination. See Rare Coin-It, Inc., 625 So. 2d at 1277; see also Va. Elec. & Lighting Corp. v. Koester, 714 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that because the order failed to specify what trade secrets existed and to set forth findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets was reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute…
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KPMG LLP v. State, 833 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…ngs to support its conclusions that the Department had demonstrated a reasonable necessity for the production of seventy-one of the documents that the lower court found contained trade secrets. See Virginia Electronics and Lighting Corp. v. Koester, 714 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). As Koester, as well as the cases cited therein, makes clear, an appellate court must be able to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s reasons for granting or denying privilege objections. This does not require revea…
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Laser Spine Inst., LLC v. Greer, 144 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…ders must contain “particularized findings in support of the determination that the [requesting party] had demonstrated a reasonable necessity for production despite the existence of trade secrets”); Virginia Electronics & Lighting Corp. v. Koester, 714 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“We conclude that, because the order fails to ... set forth findings of fact supporting a conclusion that disclosure of the trade secrets is reasonably necessary to resolve the issues in dispute, it constitutes a material…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- E. Cement Corp. v. Dep't OF Env't Reg. & Gen. Portland Cement Co., Inc., 512 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Arthur Fennieston, Inc. v. Pratt, 673 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)