RYAN S. DOOLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
CARRIE T. HARRIS, APPELLEE
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Carrie Harris was not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for injuries caused when Terri Barner drove Harris's car without permission, because there was no implied consent and the theft was not reasonably foreseeable. The court affirmed summary judgment in Harris's favor, rejecting Dooley's argument that genuine issues of material fact existed.
Summary judgment was proper because there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Harris gave Barner implied consent to use the vehicle or that the theft was reasonably foreseeable. Harris explicitly told Barner that someone else would drive her if needed, left the car locked in a closed garage, believed the keys were secured in her jewelry box, and filed police charges against Barner for the theft.
[1] The dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes vicarious liability on a motor vehicle owner who gives express or implied consent for another to operate the vehicle.
[2] A breach of custody amounting to conversion or theft may relieve a vehicle owner of liability for the negligence of a permitted driver.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who gives express or implied consent to another to operate that motor vehicle.”
Establishes the general rule of vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRyan Dooley was injured when struck by a vehicle owned by Carrie Harris. The car was being driven by Terri Barner, an acquaintance who had recently be…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Ryan Dooley appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of Carrie Harris in his personal injury action. Dooley was injured when he was struck by a vehicle owned by Harris. At the time of the accident, the car was being driven by Terri Bamer, who had taken the vehicle from Harris without permission. Dooley contends that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Barner had implied consent to take the vehicle or whether her theft of the vehicle was reasonably foreseeable. We disagree and affirm the judgment below.
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who gives express or implied consent to another to operate that motor vehicle. Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla.1993); Fought v. Mullen, 609 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Limited exceptions to this doctrine have been recognized. For example, a breach of custody amounting to a species of conversion or theft will relieve the owner of responsibility for the negligence of one to whom the owner has granted consent to operate the vehicle. Hertz; Fought. However, if a theft is reasonably foreseeable, then the owner will not be relieved of liability. Hendeles v. Sanford Auto Auction, Inc., 364 So. 2d 467 (Fla.1978); Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla.1977).
There is no evidence here from which a jury could reasonably find implied consent by Harris to Barner, or that Barner’s theft of the vehicle was reasonably foreseeable. Harris and Barner were acquaintances. Harris allowed Bamer to stay in her home a few days after Bamer had been released from jail on a probation violation for a DUI conviction. Bamer was waiting for her mother to send a ticket for her to return to Pennsylvania. Barner had no driver’s license. If she needed to go anywhere, Harris or someone else would drive her. Barner never used anyone’s car. Before leaving her home for a few days, Harris told Barner that if she needed to go anywhere, Harris’ son would drive her. Harris left her car locked in a closed garage. She believed that she left her ear keys in her jewelry box. Upon her return after the accident, the keys were gone, as were her watch and gold bracelet. When she discovered that the car was missing, Harris filed charges against Barner with the police department. Harris stated that she did not give Barner permission to use her vehicle at any time and had left the vehicle locked at her home.
We agree that the trial court properly entered summary judgment in Harris’ favor. See Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (where person operates the vehicle without the express consent of the owner and contrary to specific instructions of the owner, there is no implied consent); Pearson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., Inc., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (driver who entered the bedroom of sleeping sister and her husband, and took the keys to the husband’s company automobile to drive on a personal errand, did not have implied consent to operate the vehicle); Hankerson v. Wilcox, 173 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (company was not liable for accident where employee took employer’s truck without permission and was later involved in an accident).
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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Ming v. Interamerican CAR Rental, Inc., 913 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…er, and the behavior of both after the accident and the driver’s prior use of the vehicle. The court held that an issue of fact existed regarding consent and that a jury should resolve that issue. We affirmed a summary judgment in Dooley v. Harris, 714 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), finding no evidence of implied consent. We noted that the driver and owner were only acquaintances. The owner allowed the driver to stay at her home, during which time the driver never used the owner’s car. Upon leaving her home…
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Depriest v. Greeson, 213 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…onstrating no knowledge or control by the stepson. The undisputed facts of this case fail to establish the element of consent necessary to maintaining a cause of action under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. See, e.g., Dooley v. Harris, 714 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (affirming summary judgment upon finding no evidence of implied consent in undisputed facts). Rather than use the Ming factors to establish implied consent, Appellants rely on Decedent’s stepson’s failure to act despite having a…
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Christenson-Sullins v. Raymer, 765 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…ment. A jury would have every right to disbelieve Bisel in view of her obviously inconsistent actions with her verbal testimony. Accordingly, Bisel’s testimony is not uncontroverted as asserted by the dissent. In fact, the court in Dooley v. Harris, 714 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), cited by Judge Miner in his dissent, pointed out in affirming a summary judgment in favor of the owner of a car, that the owner had reported the person exercising the unauthorized use of the car to the police department. It, the…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Vining v. AVIS Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977)
- Hendeles v. Sanford Auto Auction, Inc., 364 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1978)
- The HERTZ Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)
- Pearson v. ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Giannone v. State, 173 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Virgilio Duarte v. Wetzel, 682 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Fought v. Mullen, 609 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)