ROBERT G. BOMAR, APPELLANT,
v.
ROLLING IN DOUGH COOKIE COMPANY, INC., AND FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-07-31
No. 97-02078
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and GREEN, JJ.,-concur.
715 So. 2d 333 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that quitting part-time employment does not disqualify an individual from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, even after the legislature amended the definition of 'work'.


Facts & Procedural History

Robert Bomar, who had long-term full-time employment and was terminated under non-disqualifying conditions, was granted unemployment benefits. He then…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Robert G. Bomar, challenges the order denying his claim for unemployment compensation benefits. We reverse the denial of his-claim for benefits.

Mr. Bomar held full-time employment with GTE Data Services thirty-one years and nine months. He was terminated under nondis-qualifying conditions. Bomar filed a claim for and was granted unemployment compensation benefits. Subsequent to this Mr. Bo-mar took a part-time job with Rolling In Dough Cookie Company, Inc. For reasons not attributable to Rolling In Dough, Mr. Bomar quit his part-time job. The appeals referee, based upon Mr. Bomar’s leaving his part-time job, concluded that Bomar was ineligible for benefits. The UAC affirmed the referee and Mr. Bomar filed a timely appeal.

Mr. Bomar conténds that he should not have been disqualified from receiving benefits for leaving part-time employment. We agree with Mr. Bomar and reverse the denial of his claim for benefits. See Berger v. Asolo Ctr. for Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The UAC contends that the legislature’s 1994 amendment of section 443.101(l)(a) which defines “work” to mean any work, whether full-time, part-time or temporary, supports the decision to disqualify Mr. Bomar from receiving benefits. The UAC s contention is refuted by this court s decision in Berger. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and GREEN, JJ.,-concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • …(Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Tierney v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Berger v. Asolo Ctr., 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Bomar v. Rolling in Dough Cookie Co., 715 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Milkolsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 721 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Rembert v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 745 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Groudas, 793 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). As this court succinctly stated in…
  • Mikolsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 721 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …Second District Court of Appeal in Berger v. Asolo Center for the Performing Arts, 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) and Berger was followed more recently in Bomar v. Rolling in Dough Cookie Company, Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 715 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). See also Pinder v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 691 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In view of these unanimous decisions from three different district courts of appeal, we have difficulty u…

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