MAXINE PETERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
SPENCER PETERSON, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this family law appeal, the court addressed whether a trial court could vacate a permanent alimony award of $1,000 per month that had been corrected by clerical error order and affirmed on prior appeal. The court held that once affirmed, the alimony award became the law of the case and could not be later vacated by the trial court.
The court held that the trial court erred in vacating the alimony award. Once the March 1992 final judgment (as corrected by the December 4, 1992 order) was affirmed on appeal, the $1,000 monthly alimony award became the law of the case and could not be later vacated by the trial court based on lack of jurisdiction or other grounds.
[1] A trial court has jurisdiction to correct a clerical error in a final judgment of dissolution to reflect an intended award of permanent periodic alimony.
[2] A prior appellate affirmation of a final judgment, as corrected by an order addressing a clerical error, establishes the law of the case regarding the alimony award.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when we affirmed the March 1992, final judgment, as corrected by the December 4, 1992, order, the award to the wife of $1,000 permanent periodic alimony became the law of the case and could not be vacated later by the trial court on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order.”
Establishes the central holding that an affirmed judgment cannot be later vacated by the trial court, even on jurisdictional grounds.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaxine and Spencer Peterson were divorced by final judgment on March 30, 1992, which awarded the former wife $1,000 per month in permanent periodic al…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Clerical Error Correction cases and more on FLexlaw
POLEN, Judge.
Maxine Peterson, the former wife, timely appeals a Final Judgment entered on the former husband’s petition for modification of the final judgment of dissolution. The parties were previously before this court in Peterson v. Peterson, 659 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (Peterson I), where we affirmed the March 1992, final judgment in all respects, including the award to the wife of $1,000 per month in permanent periodic alimony, reversing only as to a double assessment against the former husband of the former wife’s attorney’s fees for her first attorney. We subsequently affirmed the trial court’s denial of the former husband’s petition for modification in Peterson v. Peterson, 670 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (Peterson II).
While our decision in Peterson II remained pending, the former husband filed a second petition for modification, which resulted in the final judgment now before us. Of the several issues presented by the former wife, one has merit.
In its most recent final judgment, the trial court granted the former husband’s petition for modification as to alimony, “extinguish[ing] all alimony, present, past, and future, inclusive.” It found “that the Trial Judge knowingly and intentionally omitted any award of alimony to the Former Wife in the Final Judgment of March 30, 1992,” and determined “no alimony was ever awarded the Former Wife ... in this dissolution of marriage action, whatsoever.” This ruling was in error. The final judgment of dissolution was dated March 30, 1992.
The trial court left a blank space in the final judgment where the amount of the award of alimony to the former wife should have appeared. Eight months after the final judgment was entered, on November 11,1992, the former wife timely filed a motion seeking correction of this clerical error, prompting the trial court to issue an order on December 4, 1992, which provided in pertinent part:
d. That the court intended to and did award Wife permanent periodic alimony in its Final Judgment dated March 30, 1992, but inadvertently omitted the monthly sum thereof.
The trial court’s December 4, 1992, order provided that the amount of permanent periodic alimony awarded to the wife should have been $1,000 per month. The former wife correctly asserts the trial court had jurisdiction to enter this December 4, 1992, order. Generally, in the absence of mistake or fraud, a successor judge cannot review, modify, or reverse on the merits the final orders of his predecessor on the same facts. McBride v. McBride, 352 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Further, when we affirmed the March 1992, final judgment, as corrected by the December 4, 1992, order, the award to the wife of $1,000 permanent periodic alimony became the law of the case and could not be vacated later by the trial court on the basis that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. Sloane v. Sloane, 625 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (noting a per curiam decision of the appellate court is the law of the case between the same parties on the same issues and facts, and determined all issues necessarily involved in the appeal, whether mentioned in the court’s opinion or not).
Except in extraordinary circumstances, the law of the case must be followed in subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts: Warren v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc., 700 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (citing Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So. 2d 550 (Fla.1984)).
The Final Judgment on appeal is reversed as to these two provisions, with directions to reinstate the permanent periodic alimony award to the former wife of $1,000 per month, and to determine any arrearages in alimony from the entry of the final judgment of March 30, 1992. Because the trial court did not reach the merits of the former husband’s motion for modification as-to this alimony award, we remand for reconsideration of this portion of his motion; however, on remand, the former husband will be required to pay any alimony arrearages pending a final resolution of the merits of his motion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Dep't OF Revenue of the State of Fla., 452 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1984)
- McBRIDE v. McBRIDE, 352 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Sloane v. Sloane, 625 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Peterson v. Peterson, 659 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Buddy Ray Wykle v. State, 659 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Parnell v. State, 700 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Warren v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 700 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)