NANCY L. HESS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
RONALD M. HESS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this second appeal in a dissolution action, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's recalculation of the former husband's special equity in the marital home, holding that the court erroneously reconsidered findings already made in the first appeal and improperly included personal labor in the recalculation.
The trial court erred in recalculating the former husband's special equity by reconsidering its prior finding on the barter agreement and by improperly including personal labor in the recalculation. The trial court must recalculate special equity considering only the value of the barter agreement prior to marriage, without considering personal labor.
[1] A trial court errs when it reconsiders a finding of fact that was previously determined and mandated by an appellate court.
[2] A special equity in a marital home may be based on the value of labor and equipment bartered prior to the marriage.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the first appeal, we held that it was error for the trial court to allow the former husband a special equity in the marital home based on his personal labor during the construction of the home.”
Establishes the binding holding from the prior appeal that personal labor cannot support special equity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn the first appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in allowing the former husband a special equity based on his personal labor during home…
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SHAHOOD, Judge.
This is the second appeal in this dissolution action. In the first appeal, we held that it was error for the trial court to allow the former husband a special equity in the marital home based on his personal labor during the construction of the home. See Hess v. Hess, 654 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(citing Strickland v. Strickland, 494 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)). On remand, the trial court was directed to recalculate the former husband’s special equity taking into consideration only the value of the barter of labor and equipment prior to the marriage. Hess. In addition, we held that the court had incorrectly applied the Landay1 formula in calculating the amount necessary for the former husband to buy out the former wife’s interest in the marital home, and directed a recalculation of that aspect of the equitable distribution award as well. Hess.
The former wife now appeals the trial court’s order on remand, raising several issues, and the former husband cross appeals. We hold that the trial court erred in recalculating the former husband’s special equity in the marital home, and reverse on that issue only. We affirm in all other respects.
On remand, the trial court erroneously considered the former husband’s personal labor in recalculating his special equity in the marital home. In addition, although the court had previously determined that the former husband was entitled to a special equity based on the barter agreement prior to the marriage, the court reached the opposite conclusion on remand. This, too, was error since the mandate did not direct the trial court to reconsider that finding.
We therefore reverse the order on remand, and direct the trial court to recalculate only the former husband’s special equity in the marital home. In doing so, the trial court shall not consider the former husband’s personal labor in constructing the marital home. The only consideration shall be the value of the barter agreement prior to the marriage, which the trial court had originally found resulted in a special equity to the former husband.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
DELL and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. . Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1983).
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Sumner Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983)
- Strickland v. Strickland, 494 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- Hess v. Hess, 654 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)