JAMES WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
CLAVON M. WHITE, APPELLEE
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In this Florida divorce appeal, James White challenges the trial court's dissolution judgment, specifically the denial of his venue change motion, the method used to divide pension proceeds, and the court's failure to account for tax consequences. The appellate court affirms the trial court's judgment in its entirety, finding no abuse of discretion in any of the challenged rulings.
The court affirmed all three rulings, finding no error in the venue determination due to lack of transcript, no abuse of discretion in the choice of the unit benefit formula for valuing pension assets, and no abuse of discretion in failing to account for tax consequences where the evidence presented did not demonstrate tax liability beyond conjecture or speculation.
[1] A trial court's ruling on venue will not be disturbed on appeal when the record lacks a transcript of the hearing on the venue issue.
[2] A trial court has discretion to value marital assets as of the date of the final hearing in a dissolution of marriage case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court's conclusion accounts for non-economic as well as economic factors”
Establishes that the trial court properly considered multiple factors in choosing the pension valuation method and did not abuse its discretion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames and Clavon White were married in 1977. James worked for Piedmont Air (later USAir) beginning in 1965 and retired on June 1, 1994, receiving $143…
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SHEVIN, Judge.
James White appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage urging error in the trial court’s denial of his motion to change venue, in the equitable distribution of pension proceeds and in the court’s failure to consider tax consequences in fashioning the equitable distribution. We affirm.
James and Clavon were married in 1977. James began working for Piedmont Air (later USAir) in 1965, and he retired on June 1, 1994. Upon retirement, he received from the USAir Pension Program: $143,238.50 from non-qualified funds; and $778,873.70 from qualified funds. The parties deposited the non-qualified funds into a joint Raymond James account, and paid taxes ($70,000) on the non-qualified funds in 1994. The qualified funds were deposited into a Raymond James IRA account, in James’ name; no taxes were paid on those funds. The sole issue at trial was what percentage of the pension proceeds constituted marital funds. The court adopted former wife Clavon’s expert’s valuation method — the unit benefit formula — and rejected the former husband James’ expert’s valuation method — the coverture fraction formula — in dividing the pension funds. James appeals.
As to the first issue, whether venue was proper in Monroe County, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue. There is no transcript of the hearing in the record before us and we will not disturb the trial court’s finding. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979). We also find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to value the marital assets as of the date of the final hearing. § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994).
Additionally, we are not persuaded by James’ argument that the court employed the wrong formula to determine what portion of the pension plan proceeds were marital assets. The court has discretion in determining which method it chooses to employ in determining the value of the pension plan as a marital asset. See DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), disapproved on other grounds, Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla.1997). Here, the parties each presented expert testimony regarding their preferred valuation method. The court did not abuse its discretion in using one method as opposed to the other; the court’s conclusion accounts for non-economie as well as economic factors, see Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1986), and we will not reverse the distribution on this basis.
We are unpersuaded by James’ last argument that the court faded to account for tax consequences of the property division. The evidence presented did not demonstrate that tax liability amounted to anything more than conjecture or speculation. See Levan v. Levan, 545 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 554 So. 2d 1168 (Fla.1989). Therefore, failure to account for tax consequences was not an abuse of discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the final judgment in its entirety.
Affirmed.
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Acosta v. Creative Grp. Invs., Inc., 756 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…costas have failed to supply this Cóurt with a transcript of the contempt proceedings, we must presume that the trial court’s order was correct. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979). See also White v. White, 717 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(where there is no transcript of hearing in the appellate record the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court); Rodwin-Pines v. Pines, 706 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(stating that “the appellant’s fail…
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Kearney v. Bernadette Kearney, 129 So. 3d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…sive calculations on the matter” and the “fact the trial court accepted this value over that offered by the Former Husband is not the type of error that would allow this court to substitute our decision for that of the trial court”); White v. White, 717 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“Here, the parties each presented expert testimony regarding their preferred valuation method. The court did not abuse its discretion in using one method as opposed to the other.”). Ms. Kearney argues the trial judge committ…
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Torres v. Torres, 883 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…ate and the home’s value. Section 61.075(4) gives the court discretion to assign a date that is just and equitable under the circumstances, including the date of the final hearing. Jahnke v. Jahnke, 804 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); White v. White, 717 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). The court must set forth the facts supporting its valuation date in the judgment. We note that the husband’s valuation, in his financial affidavit, of the marital home at $200,000 appears incredible in light of the expert testim…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Diffenderfer v. Diffenderfer, 491 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1986)
- DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Eldis Raymell Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1997)
- Alan v. Levan, 545 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)