GERRI A. CARMICHAEL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH ASSOCIATION, FLORIDA COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH ASSOCIATION, AND MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1998-09-16
No. 97-1522
STONE, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur.
717 So. 2d 174 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1998)

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Synopsis

Gerri Carmichael appealed a trial court order denying her entitlement to attorney's fees in a case against the State Comprehensive Health Association and others. The appellate court reversed the denial of fees based on a prior appellate decision, but affirmed the trial court's decision not to apply a contingency fee multiplier.


Holding

The court reversed the trial court's denial of entitlement to attorney's fees, as a prior appellate decision had already determined that Carmichael was entitled to fees. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to apply a contingency fee multiplier, holding that while a trial court must consider such a multiplier, it is not required to apply one.


Headnotes

[1] A prior appellate award of attorney's fees in the underlying action may dictate the outcome of a subsequent trial court's determination of entitlement to fees.

[2] The existence of a contingency fee agreement does not mandate the application of a multiplier for attorney's fees.

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Key Quotes

“The existence of a contingency fee agreement does not mandate the application of a multiplier.”

Establishes that contingency fee agreements do not automatically require a fee multiplier.

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Facts & Procedural History

Carmichael was the prevailing party in an underlying action against the State Comprehensive Health Association and others. A contingency fee agreement…

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Opinion of the Court
WARNER, Judge.

WARNER, Judge.

The appellant challenges an order of the trial court denying her entitlement to attorney’s fees. The appellees concede that based upon our award of fees in the appeal of the underlying action, see State Comprehensive Health Ass’n v. Carmichael, 706 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we have already decided this issue contrary to the trial court. We therefore reverse as to the entitlement issue.

Despite its ruling that the appellant was not entitled to fees, after hearing all of the testimony regarding the amount, the trial court set the amount of fees in its order for the benefit of the parties, should this court decide that appellant was entitled to fees. Appellant also challenges the amount of fees, claiming that the court abused its discretion in failing to assess a multiplier due to the existence of a contingency fee contract between herself and her attorney. The existence of a contingency fee agreement does not mandate the application of a multiplier. See National Foundation Life Ins. Co. v. Wellington, 526 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

In Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla.1990), the court explained that while the trial court “must consider” the application of a multiplier where the prevailing party’s counsel is employed on a contingency basis, that does not mean that the trial court “must apply” a multiplier.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to apply a multiplier in this case. On remand, the trial court is directed to enter judgment for appellant’s attorney in accordance with the alternative findings of its order.

We affirm as to the remaining issues, finding they have no merit.

STONE, C.J., and GROSS, J., concur.


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