ANDREW SULLIVAN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts regarding whether additional sentencing points for firearm possession may be added when the defendant's sole conviction is for carrying a concealed weapon or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court held that such additional points constitute error and quashed the lower court decision.
It is error for a trial court to assess additional sentencing points for possessing a firearm where the sole underlying crime is carrying a concealed firearm or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The sentencing rules do not contemplate adding such points when firearm possession is an essential element of the offense itself.
[1] Additional sentencing points for possessing a firearm cannot be assessed when the sole underlying crime is carrying a concealed firearm or possession of a firearm by a co…
[2] Sentencing guidelines do not contemplate the addition of sentencing points for carrying or possessing a firearm where such act is the essential element of the underlying…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is error for a trial court to assess additional sentencing points for possessing a firearm where the sole underlying crime is carrying a concealed firearm or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon”
Establishes the core holding that firearm sentencing enhancements cannot be added when the conviction itself is for a firearm offense
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSullivan was convicted and sentenced, with the trial court assessing additional sentencing points for possessing a firearm under rule 3.702(d)(12) and…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the opinion in State v. Sullivan, 701 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), which certified conflict with the opinion in Galloway v. State, 680 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), concerning the issue of whether additional sentencing points for carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime may be added to a defendant’s sentencing score where the defendant is convicted of carrying a concealed weapon or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Recently, we resolved this conflict in White v. State, 714 So. 2d 440, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S 311 (Fla.1998), wherein we held that it is error for a trial court to assess additional sentencing points for possessing a firearm where the sole underlying crime is carrying a concealed firearm or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In other words, rule 3.702(d)(12) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 921.0014, Florida Statutes (1993), do not contemplate the addition of sentencing points for carrying or possessing a firearm where the carrying or possession of a firearm is the essential element of the underlying offense. In so holding, we approved the Fourth District’s opinion in Galloway.
Therefore, in accordance with our decision in White, we quash the decision below. We also decline to address petitioner’s remaining point on review as it is beyond the scope of the conflict issue and has been rendered moot by our disposition of this case.1
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Petitioner argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case because, although improper, the assessment of additional sentencing points did not create an illegal sentence or render the sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines.
WELLS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in Asbell v. State, 715 So. 2d 258 (Fla.1998); and White v. State, 714 So. 2d 440, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S311 (Fla.1998).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- White v. State, 714 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1998)
- Galloway v. State, 680 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Asbell v. State, 715 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1998)
- State v. Sullivan, 701 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)