ROBIN ROSHKIND, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID ROSHKIND, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal resolved a procedural issue regarding how to classify appeals from post-dissolution modification orders. The court held that final orders in child support modification proceedings are final judgments appealable as plenary appeals, rather than non-final orders, and redesignated the instant appeal accordingly.
Final orders in modification proceedings in dissolution cases are final judgments subject to motions for rehearing and appealable as plenary appeals, not non-final orders. The appeal was redesignated from non-final to final.
[1] Orders entered in modification proceedings in dissolution cases are final judgments, subject to motions for rehearing and appealable as plenary appeals.
[2] Modification proceedings in dissolution cases do not necessarily require formal service of process.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the orders entered in modification proceedings have all of the aspects of final judgments. We therefore conclude that they are final judgments, subject to motions for rehearing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a), and appeal-able as plenary appeals.”
Establishes the core holding that modification orders are final judgments, not non-final orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe father filed a motion for modification to reduce his child support obligation in a post-dissolution case. The trial court granted the father's mot…
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KLEIN, Judge.
We routinely redesignate as final, appeals which are improperly filed as non-final, and vice-versa, without publishing the orders; however, we have concluded that publication of this order would be helpful to the Bar. This is an appeal from a postdissolution order granting the father’s motion for modification to reduce his child support obligation.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(h) provides:
When the nature of an action permits pleadings subsequent to final judgment and the jurisdiction of the court over the parties has not terminated, the initial pleading subsequent to final judgment shall be designated a supplemental complaint or petition. The action shall then proceed in the same manner and time as though the supplemental complaint or petition were the initial pleading in the action, including the issuance of any needed process. This subdivision shall not apply to proceedings that may be initiated by motion under these rules.
Modification proceedings in dissolution cases do not necessarily require formal service of process. Carnerario v. Carnerario, 340 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 472 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); and Sikes v. Sikes, 286 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Nor do they necessarily require payment of a circuit court filing fee. Hagins v. McNeal, 647 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
The issue before us, which was not decided in the above cases, is whether a final order in a modification proceeding is a final judgment, to be appealed by plenary appeal, or an order entered after final judgment, reviewable as a non-final appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(4). Although the above decisions would support an argument that petitions for modification are not independent actions, the orders entered in modification proceedings have all of the aspects of final judgments. We therefore conclude that they are final judgments, subject to motions for rehearing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a), and appeal-able as plenary appeals. We accordingly redesignate this appeal as a final appeal, as we did in Chena v. Cherna, 427 So. 2d 395 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA1983).
WARNER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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T.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 736 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…n my opinion, once the trial court had ruled on appellant’s petition, its labor was over as to the only matter then pending before it and, therefore, for purposes of appellant’s petition, the order was final and appealable. See Roshkind v. Roshkind, 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (treating an appeal from a post-dissolution order granting a motion to modify the final judgment by reducing child support as one from a final order). However, even if the majority is correct that the order is not sufficiently f…
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Quillen v. Quillen, 247 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
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Artemio Milares Bucsit v. Bucsit, 229 So. 3d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ings have all of the aspects of final judg-mente. We therefore conclude that they are final judgments, subject to motions for re [*432] hearing under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(a), and appealable as plenary appeals.” Roshkind v. Roshkind, 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). . In 2013, subdivision (d) was amended to lengthen the deadline from ten to fifteen days for a trial court to act of its own accord. See In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 131 So. 3d 643, 651 (Fla. 2013)…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lyla Madolin Sikes v. Sikes, 286 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Camerano v. Helen Camerano (Michalak), 340 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Cherna v. Cherna, 427 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Gilbert v. Gilbert, 472 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Anne Hagins v. Hon. Raymond T. McNEAL, 647 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)