JAMES WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Williams challenged his guilty pleas to armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and attempted first-degree murder, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence. The court reversed the trial court's denial of his postconviction motion, holding that ineffective assistance claims based on counsel's failure to suppress evidence can invalidate a guilty plea in collateral proceedings, even though such claims might be limited on direct appeal.
The court held that counsel's alleged deficiency in failing to move to suppress evidence may have rendered the guilty plea involuntary and constitutes a facially sufficient attack on the conviction in a collateral proceeding. The principle limiting appeal of guilty pleas to errors invalidating the plea itself applies only to direct appeals, not collateral attacks on the plea and counsel's advice.
[1] A defendant who pleads guilty may appeal only those errors that would invalidate the plea itself when the proceeding is a direct appeal.
[2] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to suppress evidence is a collateral attack on a guilty plea, not a direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This principle may accurately describe the range of issues raised on direct appeal from a guilty plea; this proceeding in the trial court, however, was not a direct appeal, but a collateral attack on the plea itself and upon counsel's advice which prompted the plea.”
Establishes the critical distinction between limitations on direct appeal versus collateral attacks on guilty pleas
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJames Williams entered guilty pleas to armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and attempted first-degree murder. He filed a postconviction motion all…
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PER CURIAM.
James Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his postconviction motion which alleges, in relevant part, ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to move to' suppress evidence against him which prompted counsel to advise him to enter guilty pleas to armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and attempted first-degree murder. We reverse.
In its denial, the trial court concluded that a criminal “defendant who pleads guilty may appeal only those errors which would invalidate the plea itself,” referencing Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1979), and Harvey v. State, 383 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). This principle may accurately describe the range of issues raised on direct appeal from a guilty plea; this proceeding in the trial court, however, was not a direct appeal, but a collateral attack on the plea itself and upon counsel’s advice which prompted the plea. Williams’ claim must be analyzed in this light. See Simmons v. State, 485 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that counsel’s alleged deficiency in failing to move to suppress evidence may have rendered guilty plea involuntary, and that claim required record refutation or an evidentiary hearing to resolve it); see also Devega v. State, 706 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (echoing the holding of Simmons while silent on whether the conviction under attack resulted from a trial or a plea); Stewart v. State, 629 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence in the context of a trial may serve as grounds to vacate a conviction).
A trial attorney’s failure to investigate a factual defense or a defense relying on the suppression of evidence, which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty, has long been held to constitute a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction. See Kelly v. State, 712 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), and Stanley v. State, 703 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that in the context of guilty pleas the appellants stated facially sufficient claims that counsel had overlooked defenses of voluntary intoxication). See also Fortner v. State, 538 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (holding that the allegation in the context of a plea that trial counsel failed to move to suppress an incriminating statement constituted a facially sufficient claim).
We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of Williams’ other assertions without discussion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for reconsideration in' accordance with this opinion.
PARKER, C.J., and FRANK and FULMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (21 total)
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Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003)…203 (1985), that the two-part test of Strickland applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process. See also Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 280 n. 2 (Fla.1988) (recognizing the Hill decision); Williams v. State, 717 So. 2d 1066, 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“A trial attorney’s failure to investigate ... a defense relying on the suppression of evidence, which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty ... constitute^] a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction.…
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MacKinnon v. State, 39 So. 3d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…to investigate a factual defense or a defense relying on the suppression of evidence, which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty, has long been held to constitute a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction.” Williams v. State, 717 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Spencer v. State, 889 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“An allegation that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress is a legally sufficient claim, which is not waived by en…
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Cordes v. State, 842 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…eld that the issues were waived when Mr. Cordes entered his plea. Mr. Cordes did not waive his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his plea. See Jenrette v. State, 761 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Williams v. State, 717 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). Moreover, Mr. Cordes established his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or pursue a defense of statute of limitations prior to advising Mr. Cordes to enter a plea of no contest to these four charges. To prove a…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gissendanner v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)
- Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)
- Simmons v. State, 485 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Otero v. State, 703 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Hill v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 712 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Fortner v. State, 538 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Emory Harvey v. State, 383 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Stewart v. State, 629 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Kelvin v. State, 706 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Cullen v. State, 706 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)