STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
J. M., A CHILD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of two delinquency petitions against a juvenile defendant. The trial court dismissed the petitions because the child was already committed to a level 8 program, deeming further prosecution futile. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court exceeded its authority by interfering with prosecutorial discretion.
The trial court exceeded its constitutional authority in dismissing the petitions. The decision whether to charge and prosecute is an executive branch responsibility that rests exclusively with the state attorney, and judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion is impermissible absent constitutional constraints. The trial court's purported authority under Florida Statutes section 985.231(1)(f) applies only at the disposition stage, not pre-trial.
[1] The decision to charge and prosecute is an executive branch responsibility.
[2] A state attorney possesses complete discretion in determining whether to prosecute, including the authority to continue to prosecute.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The decision whether to charge and prosecute is an executive branch responsibility.”
Establishes that prosecution authority belongs to the executive branch, not the judiciary.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.M., a child, was alleged to have sold a counterfeit drug and committed a battery in two separate cases. Prior to trial, J.M. had been committed by c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Separation Of Powers (Fla. Const. Art. Ii, § 3) cases and more on FLexlaw
CASANUEVA, Judge.
The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of two petitions alleging J.M. committed delinquent acts. In case number 98-00393, the State alleged J.M. sold a counterfeit drug; in case number 98-00382, the State alleged J.M. committed a battery. Because J.M. was already committed by court order to a level 8 program with the Department of Juvenile Justice, the trial court concluded that further prosecution of J.M. was futile. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed each pre-trial petition. The State contends the trial court exceeded its authority in so doing. We agree and reverse.
Article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution provides that a person belonging to one branch of government shall not “exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.” The decision whether to charge and prosecute is an executive branch responsibility. See Burk v. Washington, 713 So. 2d 988, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S314 (Fla. June 12,1998). The state attorney possesses complete discretion in determining whether to prosecute, which includes the authority to continue to prosecute. See State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla.1986). This discretionary authority to prosecute applies equally to juvenile cases. See State v. A.R.S., 684 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). A judicial limit to this discretion arises where constitutional constraints are implicated. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). Here, as no constitutional rights are implicated, the trial court improperly interfered with prosecutorial discretion.
The trial court found it had authority to dismiss the petitions under the facts of this case based on section 985.231(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1997). We hold that in this situation it does not.
The legislature expressly granted to the court certain powers of disposition in delinquency cases in section 985.231. Subsection (l)(f) of this statute provides the trial court with the dispositional authority to terminate the court’s jurisdiction over a child at any time. By clear legislative directive, this 'authority does not arise until the court is considering “disposition” alternatives, in other words, sentencing alternatives. In neither of J. M.’s cases had the trial court yet determined that the child had committed an act of delinquency. Therefore, the trial court’s exercise of this power was premature. We do not believe that the legislature sought, by enacting this section, to enable the judiciary to intrude upon the executive branch authority in violation of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
We reverse the dismissal of each petition and remand with instructions to reinstate them.
BLUE, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Henry v. State, 825 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…)). Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other “unjustifiable” classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution “must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, rel…
-
State v. Diondrick Gibson, 935 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…in gathering information relevant to an initial inquiry into suspected criminal activity....” Doe v. State, 634 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla.1994). “A judicial limit to this discretion arises where constitutional constraints are implicated.” State v. J.M., 718 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in this instance by injecting itself into the State’s investigative function where no constitutional constraints are implicated. The State simply seeks to…
-
Tucker v. State, 987 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…da, the prosecuting authority is the state attorney, who has the complete discretion to initiate, continue or terminate a “prosecution.” State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla.1986); Henry v. State, 825 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); State v. J.M., 718 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Thus, in Willacy v. State, 640 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1994), even though the juror had been arrested and his charges remained pending, the court held that he was not “under prosecution” at the time of his jury service because the…
Authorities Cited
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (U.S. 1985)
- State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986)
- State v. A.R.S., 684 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Hon. Warren Burk v. Shalonda Washington, 713 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1998)