RENE BAAS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
PATRICIA BAAS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent periodic alimony but erred in denying the wife's motion for attorney's fees.
The husband appealed a final judgment of dissolution, challenging the award of permanent periodic alimony and the denial of the wife's motion for atto…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Alimony cases and more on FLexlaw
WHATLEY, Judge.
The husband appeals and the wife cross-appeals the final judgment of dissolution. We affirm the award of permanent periodic alimony to the wife and reverse the denial of her motion for attorney’s fees.
The parties’ separation agreement, which was incorporated into the final judgr ment, did not contain an unambiguous waiver of the right to seek alimony, see White v. White, 617 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA1993), and therefore, the husband’s contention that the alimony award violates that agreement is without merit.
The husband has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the forty-six-year-old wife of this twenty-six year marriage $700 a month in permanent periodic alimony. The wife, a high school graduate, testified that she believes she has reached the upper end of her earning capacity as a secretary. The husband has a four-year degree in criminology. His income is approximately twice that of the wife’s and half of that income is not taxable.
These same facts reveal the error in the trial court’s denial of the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees. See Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla.1997) (primary consideration in award of attorney’s fees is financial resources of parties; other relevant factors are scope and history of litigation, duration of litigation, merits of respective positions, whether litigation was brought or maintained primarily to harass, and existence and course of prior or pending litigation).
Accordingly, we affirm the award of permanent periodic alimony to the wife but reverse the denial of an award to her of attorney’s fees and remand with directions that the trial court determine whether the husband should pay part or all of the wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
QUINCE, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Worley v. Worley, 855 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…. Here, as in White, there is no mention of alimony or support in the prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded that the Wife waived her right to seek future support by executing the agreement. See also Baas v. Baas, 718 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding without merit the husband’s contention that the alimony award violates the parties’ separation agreement as the agreement failed to contain an unambiguous waiver of the right to seek alimony). Likewise, we conclude that…
-
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 918 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…he dissolution of marriage and continued to owe a substantial portion of those fees to his attorneys, the trial court abused its discretion when it did not require the Wife to pay a greater portion of the Husband’s attorneys’ fees. See Baas v. Baas, 718 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA [*415] 1998); Nelson, 588 So. 2d 1049. Of course, on remand, the appropriate contribution toward the Husband’s attorneys’ fees may depend in part upon the new award of permanent periodic alimony because that award will affect the Wife’s…
Authorities Cited
- Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)
- Blanco v. State, 617 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- White v. Forrest H. White, 617 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)