PINNACLE CORPORATION OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, D/B/A TOWN & COUNTRY HOMES, APPELLANT,
v.
R.L. JERNIGAN SANDBLASTING & PAINTING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Town & Country appealed a default judgment entered by the trial court for failure to timely respond to a complaint. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment because Town & Country's answer was filed before the default order was actually filed with the clerk, and a timely motion for extension of time effectively extended the deadline pending the court's ruling.
The trial court erred in entering the default judgment. Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c), a party may plead or otherwise defend before an order of default is entered. Because Town & Country's answer was filed before the order of default was actually filed with the clerk, and because a timely motion for extension effectively extends the deadline pending the court's ruling, Town & Country was not in default.
[1] A party may plead or otherwise defend before an order of default is entered, even if the court has orally announced its decision to enter default.
[2] An order is not deemed entered until it is filed with the clerk, not merely signed by the judge.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c), however, plainly authorizes a party to plead or otherwise defend before an order of default is entered. An order is not deemed 'entered,' even if it has been signed by the trial court, until it is actually filed with the clerk.”
Establishes the key legal principle that a default order is only entered upon filing with the clerk, not upon signing, allowing a party to file a responsive pleading before that point.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJernigan sued Town & Country, a home builder, for unpaid painting services on August 15, 1997. Town & Country was served on August 20, 1997. On Septem…
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THREADGILL, Judge.
The appellant, Pinnacle Corporation of Central Florida, Inc., d/b/a Town & Country Homes (Town & Country), challenges a final default judgment for money damages entered against it pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b). We reverse.
The appellee, R.L. Jernigan Sandblasting & Painting, Ine. (Jernigan), sued Town & Country, a home builder, for damages when it failed to pay for painting services rendered by Jernigan on various new home projects. Jernigan’s complaint was filed on August 15, 1997, and Town & Country was served on August 20, 1997. On September 9, 1997, the last day for filing a responsive pleading, Town & Country filed a motion in the trial court for a ten-day extension of time to respond to the complaint. It also set a hearing date for the motion at that time. Two days later, on September 11,1997, Jernigan filed a motion for entry of a default.
Both parties’ motions were heard on September 16, 1997. Although there is no transcript of the hearing conducted on that date, it is undisputed that Town & Country argued that it needed additional time to answer, because the complaint and exhibits attached thereto were voluminous and involved numerous properties and competing claims. Town & Country also informed the trial court that Jernigan’s counsel refused to agree to an extension. Jernigan argued that Town & Country had had enough time and all of the information it needed to timely respond to the complaint, and that Town & Country had failed to settle part of the claim pursuant to an earlier agreement.
The trial court agreed with Jernigan and announced its decision to enter a default judgment against Town & Country and to deny Town & Country’s motion for an extension of time. Town & Country then filed its answer and affirmative defenses on September 17, 1997, the day after the hearing.
On September 25, 1997, the trial court filed with the clerk its written order granting a final default judgment in favor of Jernigan.
On October 6, 1997, Town & Country filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. That motion was denied. Town & Country then filed a timely notice of appeal in this court.
Under the circumstances herein, it was error for the trial court to enter a default judgment against Town & Country for its failure to plead. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) authorizes a trial court to enter a default against a party for failure to plead or otherwise defend. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(c), however, plainly authorizes a party to plead or otherwise defend before an order of default is entered. An order is not deemed “entered,” even if it has been signed by the trial court, until it is actually filed with the clerk. See Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 388 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Since the answer and affirmative defenses in this case were filed before an order of default was entered, the trial court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment it improperly entered against Town & Country.
We also note that in Goldy v. Corbett Cranes Services, Inc., 692 So. 2d 225, 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District concluded that timely motions for extensions of procedural deadlines filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b) “effectively extendí ] the subject period beyond its prescribed deadline pending a ruling on the motion.” Since Town & Country filed a timely motion for an extension of time in this instance, it was not in default at the time the trial court orally pronounced its ruling.
The final judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded with directions to vacate the order of default and to conduct the appropriate further proceedings.
Reversed.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., concur.
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Pro-Art Dental LAB, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008)…ed a responsive pleading or otherwise defended before the entry of default. See, e.g., Becker v. Re/Max Horizons Realty, Inc., 819 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Pinnacle Corp. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. R.L. Jemigan Sandblasting & Painting, Inc., 718 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 383 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); TLC Trust v. Sender, 757 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Carder v. Pelican Cove W. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 595 So. 2d 174, 174-75 (F…
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Ochoa v. Koppel, 197 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…a “sincere desire to settle” pursuant to a proposal for settlement and a legitimate need for an enlargement of time. Id. Our court has twice discussed Goldy. In Pinnacle Corp. of Central Florida, Inc. v. R.L. Jernigan Sandblasting & Painting, Inc., 718 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), which was an appeal from a final default judgment, we cited it -without analysis for the proposition that a defendant’s motion to extend time to answer a complaint “effectively extend[ed]” the time it had to do so. That sta…
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Singh v. U.S. Bank, 223 So. 3d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…efendant’s answer is served prior to entry of default even where it is not filed within the time granted by the trial court upon the denial of a motion to dismiss.”); Pinnacle Corp. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. R.L. Jernigan Sandblasting & Painting, Inc., 718 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“Since the answer and affirmative defenses in this case' were filed before an order of default was entered, the trial court erred in failing" to vacate the default judgment it improperly entered against [defendant].”). As…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schuyler v. Singletary, 692 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Goldy v. Corbett Cranes Servs., Inc., 692 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)