MARY RICHARDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mary Richardson appealed the summary denial of her post-conviction relief motion challenging a 1988 conviction. The court affirmed the denial of most claims as untimely but reversed and remanded regarding a scoresheet calculation challenge, which may be raised at any time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of most of Richardson's untimely claims but reversed and remanded the claim relating to scoresheet calculations, which may be raised at any time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and should be examined by the trial court rather than summarily denied.
[1] A motion for post-conviction relief challenging a conviction that became final in 1988 is generally untimely.
[2] Claims relating to score-sheet calculations may be raised at any time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with the trial court that most of Richardson's claims are untimely raised. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). Therefore, with one exception explained below, we affirm the trial court's order under review.”
The court's determination that most claims are untimely under rule 3.850(b) but reserves judgment on one exception.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichardson was convicted in 1988 of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs, and was sentenced to …
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[*40] PER CURIAM.
Mary Richardson appeals the summary denial of her motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied Richardson’s motion on the basis that it was untimely filed because it addressed a conviction that became final in 1988. The trial court attached copies of the 1988 judgment and sentences to its order. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Richardson was convicted in 1988 of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs. She was sentenced to five years in prison, followed by ten years’ probation, all pursuant to a negotiated plea. She did not appeal this judgment and sentence. In 1990, she violated her probation. Her present motion challenges the conviction and sentence which the trial court imposed in 1990 for this violation of probation.
We agree with the trial court that most of Richardson’s claims are untimely raised. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). Therefore, with one exception explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order under review.
Richardson raises a claim relating to score-sheet calculations which may be raised at any time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See, e.g., Glanton v. State, 705 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(stating that erroneous scoresheet calculation was apparent from the face of the record and therefore correctable under rule 3.800(a)). Even though Richardson styled her motion as having been brought via rule 3.850, it would be in the interest of justice to treat any claims cognizable under rule 3.800(a) as having been raised in such a motion. See DeSantis v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Fenter v. State, 632 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
There is nothing attached to the order under review that refutes Richardson’s claim that the trial court used an incorrectly calculated scoresheet when sentencing her for the violation of probation in the 1988 case. Accordingly, we remand this cause for the trial court to examine this particular claim. If the trial court determines that it is without merit, it shall attach to its order of denial the relevant portions of the record which support its conclusion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
CAMPBELL, AC.J., and FULMER and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.
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Prince v. State, 903 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…inal Procedure 3.850. See Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (requiring the trial court to consider whether claims improperly raised under rule 3.800(a) are facially sufficient under rule 3.850); see also Richardson v. State, 719 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) [*1070] (“Even though Richardson styled her motion as having been brought via rule 3.850, it would be in the interest of justice to treat any claims cognizable under rule 3.800(a) as having been raised in such a motion.”). Re…
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Raynard Wilder v. State, 967 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…ule 3.800(a) motion. Byers v. State, 916 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The trial court should have treated the appellant’s motion as one filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Valdes v. State, 765 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Richardson v. State, 719 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Accordingly, the order denying the appellant’s motion is reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to resentenee the appellant or attach portions of the record refuting his claim. REVERSED and REMANDED. BROWNING,…
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Richardson v. State, 768 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ears. She did not claim that there was any discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written sentence. The trial court denied her motion and we affirmed except as to a claim that a scoresheet was incorrectly calculated. See Richardson v. State, 719 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Now she argues that her 1988 sentence was supposed to be a true split sentence when it was orally imposed and, thus, the 1990 sentence is illegal because it cannot exceed the length of the remainder of the true split sentence.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- DeSANTIS v. State, 400 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Fenter v. State, 632 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Glanton v. State, 705 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)