WAYNE WATKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO., ETC., APPELLEE
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Wayne Watkins appeals a trial court's order enjoining him from breaching a noncompete clause in his employment contract with Colonial Life and ordering arbitration of damages. The appellate court reverses both orders, finding the permanent injunction was entered improperly without compliance with procedural rules and that Colonial Life waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court.
The permanent injunction must be reversed because the trial court improperly entered it without complying with procedural requirements and without proper notice that a permanent injunction was being considered. Additionally, the trial court's order allowing Colonial Life to proceed to arbitration must be reversed because Colonial Life waived its right to arbitration by filing an action for damages in circuit court.
[1] A permanent injunction cannot be entered without the defendant first filing an answer to the complaint.
[2] A trial court errs in deeming a hearing to consider a temporary injunction as a hearing for a permanent injunction without proper notice or agreement of the parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the hearing on the issuance of the permanent injunction was conducted by the trial court before Mr. Watkins even filed an answer to Colonial Life's complaint. More importantly, the continuing dialogue between the parties as well as with the trial court prior to the hearing indicated their mutual agreement that the hearing was set to consider the limited issue of whether the issuance of a temporary injunction would be proper.”
Establishes that the trial court improperly entered a permanent injunction when the hearing was understood to address only temporary injunction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWayne Watkins was employed by Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company under a contract containing a noncompete clause. Colonial Life filed a compla…
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[*935] ANTOON, Judge.
Wayne Watkins appeals the trial court’s orders which (1) enjoin him from breaching the noncompete clause of his employment contract with appellee, Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company (Colonial Life), and (2) authorize Colonial Life to proceed to arbitration on its claim of breach of contract.1 We must reverse both orders.
Colonial Life filed a complaint against Mr. Watkins alleging that he had breached the parties’ employment contract by violating the terms of the contract’s noncompete clause. The complaint sought recovery of damages as well as injunctive relief. Colonial Life also filed a motion for an ex parte temporary injunction, requesting the trial court to enjoin Mr. Watkins from further violating the terms of the noncompete clause. After an ex parte temporary injunction was entered, Mr. Watkins filed a motion to dissolve the injunction. Upon review, the trial court granted the motion to dissolve. Colonial Life thereafter immediately scheduled a hearing to consider the entry of a temporary injunction.
At the hearing, the trial court inexplicably deemed the hearing to constitute a hearing regarding the entry of a permanent injunction. Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court entered a permanent injunction ordering Mr. Watkins to comply with the terms of the parties’ noncompete agreement.
After the permanent injunction was entered, Colonial Life filed a demand for arbitration on the remaining issue of damages. Mr. Watkins objected, arguing that Colonial Life had waived its right to seek arbitration by filing its lawsuit for damages in the circuit court. The trial court overruled Mr. Watkins’ objection and entered an order stating that Colonial Life is “entitled to arbitration and to pursue damages.” This appeal followed.
Mr. Watkins first argues that the permanent injunction must be reversed because it was error for the trial court to enter the permanent injunction without first requiring Colonial Life to comply with the provisions of rule 1.440 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
We agree. Here, the hearing on the issuance of the permanent injunction was conducted by the trial court before Mr. Watkins even filed an answer to Colonial Life’s complaint. More importantly, the continuing dialogue between the parties as well as with the trial court prior to the hearing indicated their mutual agreement that the hearing was set to consider the limited issue of whether the issuance of a temporary injunction would be proper. As a result, the unexpected consideration of the propriety of issuing a permanent injunction was improper. See Mackes v. St. Lucie Paper & Packaging, Inc., 625 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. v. Levin, 645 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
Furthermore, the injunction order cannot be sustained as constituting a valid temporary injunction because the order fails to set forth the specific findings required for issuance of a temporary injunction and also fails to set bond as required by rule 1.610(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Mitts, Boyle & Associates, Inc. v. Boyle Accounting Services, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Harrison v. Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
We must also reverse the trial court’s ruling that Colonial Life is entitled to proceed to arbitration on the remaining issue of damages because Colonial Life waived its right to seek arbitration by filing an action for damages in the circuit court. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Fredray, Inc., 521 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to rules 9.130(a)(3)(B), (a)(3)(C)(v) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Yardley v. Ina Marie Albu, 826 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…Dade County v. Church & Tower, Inc., 715 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); St. Lucie County v. Town of St. Lucie Vill., 603 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 613 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1992)). . See also Watkins v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 719 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Mitts, Boyle & Assocs., Inc. v. Boyle Accounting Seivs., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1218, 1218 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Snibbe v. Napoleonic Soc’y of Am., Inc., 682 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); City of Jaclcsonville v. Naegele O…
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Fla. Water Servs. Corp. v. Blue Stone Real Est. Constr., 747 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…f a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. A temporary injunction order cannot be sustained if the order fails to set forth sufficient factual findings to support the trial court’s rulings. See Watkins v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 719 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Duryea v. Slater, 677 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Accordingly, we must reverse the temporary injunction and remand this matter for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . Juris…
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Alliant Cap., Ltd. v. Singleton, 835 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…junction. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610; Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Florida Water Services. Corp. v. Blue Stone Real Estate Constr., 747 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); citing, Watkins v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 719 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Specifically, the court failed to set forth facts to support each element that a moving party must establish to be entitled to the issuance of a temporary injunction: (1) irreparable harm; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) a cl…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harrison v. Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. v. Levin, 645 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- MacKes v. ST. Lucie Paper & Packaging, Inc., 625 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Edmond v. State, 521 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Mitts v. Boyle Acct. Servs., Inc., 703 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Weisman v. State, 703 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)