MARK ANTHONY BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mark Anthony Brown appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop, arguing there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, including the driver's behavior of circling the parking lot and looking into the officer's vehicle during an undercover drug buy operation.
The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The driver's behavior—circling the parking lot, pulling up alongside the officer's vehicle twice to look inside, and leaving when no one was visible—was consistent with someone looking for the undercover officer and suggested the driver was the suspected dealer the officer had arranged to meet.
[1] An investigatory stop is lawful when an officer possesses an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the subject detained has committed or is about to commit a crime.
[2] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires only that suspicion which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a sto…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To conduct a lawful investigatory stop or detention, an officer must have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the subject detained has committed or is about to commit a crime.”
Establishes the foundational legal standard for investigatory stops under Terry v. Ohio.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn undercover officer arranged a cocaine purchase using a pager number provided by a confidential informant. The officer parked his distinctive vehicl…
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ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge.
Appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, specifically reserving his right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress. We affirm.
Agent Black (Black) of the Orange County Sheriffs Office was given a pager number by a confidential informant, which number allegedly belonged to a drug dealer. Posing as a would be buyer, Black used the number to arrange a cocaine buy. He testified that he had two phone conversations with the suspected dealer, and from the speech patterns, he concluded that the person he spoke with was a black male. When Black asked the suspect what kind of car he would be driving, he was told “we’ll find you”, thus leading him to believe that more than one person would be in that vehicle. Black agreed to meet the suspected dealer at a local shopping center, describing his car in detail, and specifying a spot in the shopping center parking lot where there was little activity. Black parked his car diagonally across several spaces so that it would stand out, and testified that no other cars were parked within two or three spaces on either side of his car. When the suspected dealer had not arrived almost an hour past the designated time, Black went to a pay phone within sight of his car, and called the number again. Shortly thereafter, a car operated by defendant, a black male, and with several other occupants, drove into the parking lot, drove the entire parking lot from east to west, then pulled up directly alongside Black’s vehicle. Defendant looked into Black’s vehicle, then drove off. He then circled the lot again, pulled up along side of Black’s car again, and took a longer look into his car. Seeing no one in the car, defendant drove off and left the parking lot. Black radioed to a patrol officer who was part of his team, who then stopped defendant’s vehicle. After a K-9 dog alerted to drugs, the car was searched and the evidence discovered. Appellant argues only that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, and that the subsequent search was illegal.
To conduct a lawful investigatory stop or detention, an officer must have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the subject detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1992). “Reasonable suspicion” is such suspicion as would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop is appropriate, and is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause. Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop, each case is evaluated on its particular facts. Reynolds, at 1084. The appropriate question in each case is whether the action was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances as interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge. Johnson, at 1273. Factors which may be considered to determine whether they reasonably suggest the suspect’s possible commission of a crime include the location, the physical appearance of the suspect, the behavior of the suspect, the appearance and manner of operation of any car involved and anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge. Id. The facts before the court justified a conclusion that the actions of the driver which Black described, led Black to a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was looking for him, and was not merely looking for a place to park, and that he was the person whom Black had arranged to meet.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed to be correct. Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1329, 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). A reviewing court must interpret the evidence and all reasonable deductions and inferences which may be drawn therefrom in a manner most favorable to the trial judge’s conclusion. Johnson, supra; Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982, 101 S.Ct. 1519, 67 L.Ed.2d 818 (1981).
The evidence before the trial court supports its conclusion that the stop was based on reasonable suspicion, and is therefore
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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McMASTER v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…A 1998) (citing State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d at 727, 731 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 626 So. 2d 205 (Fla.1993)). Thus the legitimacy of the stop must be determined by consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Factors that may reasonably suggest a suspect’s possible commission of a crime include the location (for example, a high crime area), physical appearance of the suspects, the behavior of the suspects (for example, unprovoked fli…
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…rry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (emphasis added). Stated differently, to justify a warrantless stop an officer must have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred. Brown v. State, 719 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). To meet its burden of showing that the stop was legal, Petitioner chose to rely solely on the trooper’s charging affidavit, which, in material part, stated: “Observe [sic] the above name [sic] defendant violate F.S.S. 316…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1992)
- Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983)
- Griffin v. Texas, 465 U.S. 1051 (U.S. 1984)
- Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Dairymen, Inc., 465 U.S. 1051 (U.S. 1984)
- Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980)
- Hanigan v. United States, 450 U.S. 982 (U.S. 1981)
- Spencer v. Howe Richardson Scale Co., 450 U.S. 982 (U.S. 1981)
- Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)