ROLAND POIRIER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roland Poirier appealed his conviction for aggravated battery and battery, challenging the trial court's scheduling of his trial fifteen days after filing a notice of expiration of speedy trial time (rather than ten days as required) and the imposition of an upward departure sentence without written reasons. The appellate court affirmed, holding that bringing a defendant to trial within fifteen days of filing such a notice is harmless even if the ten-day rule is technically violated, and finding no error in the sentencing.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that under State v. Salzero, a violation of the ten-day period required by rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if the defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing the notice of expiration. The court also found no error regarding the sentencing after reviewing the supplemental record.
[1] A violation of the five- and ten-day periods provided in rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice…
[2] A trial court must hold a hearing on a notice of expiration of speedy trial time no later than five days from the date of its filing.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall hold a hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists, shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days.”
The operative rule governing the timing requirements for speedy trial hearings and trial scheduling that the appellant challenged.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePoirier filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial on October 28, 1996. A hearing was held that same day, at which the prosecutor twice asked the co…
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SHAHOOD, Judge.
We affirm appellant’s, Roland Poirier, conviction and sentence for aggravated battery and battery. We write to discuss two issues raised by appellant.
In this case, appellant filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial on October 28, 1996. That same day, a hearing was held at which the prosecutor twice asked the court whether it intended to set a five-day hearing on the motion, and the court twice responded that it was just going to set the matter for trial within fifteen days. The trial took place on November 12, 1996, fifteen days after the filing of the Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial.
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to begin his trial within ten days of the hearing on his Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial even though he was brought to trial within fifteen days.
Rule 3.191(p)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998) provides as follows:
No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall hold a hearing on the notice and, unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists, shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime.
In State v. Salzero, 714 So. 2d 445 (Fla.1998), the court recently interpreted the committee notes to the 1984 amendment of the rule and concluded that strict adherence to the rule’s five and ten-day requirements would not comport with the intent of the drafters. The court therefore held that “a violation of the five-and ten-day periods provided in rule 3.191(p)(3) is harmless if a defendant is actually brought to trial within fifteen days of filing his notice of expiration.” Id.
Based on Salzero, we affirm Poirier’s conviction since he was brought to trial within fifteen days from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge.
Another issue raised by appellant is the trial court’s alleged failure to provide written reasons for the imposition of an upward departure sentence. After reviewing supplemental record provided to us by the clerk of the trial court, we are satisfied that there has been no error in this regard.
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, J, and BRYAN, BEN L., Associate Judge, concur.