K.D.G., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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K.D.G. was adjudicated delinquent for possessing cannabis and drug paraphernalia found in a car he had recently purchased. The appellate court reversed, holding that where a defendant has only nonexclusive constructive possession of a vehicle, the State must present corroborating evidence of knowledge of the contraband, which was entirely absent here.
The motion for acquittal should have been granted. When a defendant has only nonexclusive constructive possession of a vehicle, the State must present corroborating evidence of knowledge of the contraband to establish a prima facie case. Here, the State failed to present any such evidence.
[1] Proof of nonexclusive constructive possession of a vehicle alone is insufficient to establish knowledge of contraband found within the vehicle.
[2] In cases of nonexclusive constructive possession of a vehicle, the State must present corroborating evidence of knowledge to establish a prima facie case.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the State can make out a prima facie case of knowledge by proof of actual or exclusive constructive possession, but proof of nonexclusive constructive possession alone is insufficient to justify an implication of knowledge”
Establishes the critical distinction that nonexclusive constructive possession alone cannot support an inference of knowledge without corroborating evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Turner approached a parked car with its hood up and no lights at night, finding K.D.G. sleeping in the driver's seat and another male in the p…
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
K.D.G. seeks review of his adjudication of delinquency for possessing cannabis and drug paraphernalia. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal. We agree and reverse the adjudication of delinquency.
The evidence at trial established that Officer Turner of the Tampa Police Department initially approached a parked car on a roadway with its hood up and no lights at night. He noticed two black males sleeping inside the car. K.D.G. was in the driver’s seat. Officer Cruegar spoke to the passenger and then observed an object wrapped in newspaper that was halfway under KD.G.’s seat. When Officer Cruegar asked K.D.G. what the object was, K.D.G. said he did not know. When Officer Cruegar asked if he could see the object, K.D.G. said “sure” and handed it to him. Officer Cruegar could not tell what the object was until he unwrapped it and found a water pipe with a residue and odor of marijuana. The officers searched the vehicle and found marijuana in the ash tray. Officer Turner testified that K.D.G. said that the pipe and marijuana were not his, that he had just purchased the car earlier that day and nothing in the ear was his. Officer Cruegar testified that K.D.G. made no statement admitting to ownership of the items.
The motion for acquittal should have been granted because K.D.G. had nonexclusive constructive possession of the automobile and the State failed to present any evidence to establish K.D.G.’s knowledge of the nature of the contraband.
[T]he State can make out a prima facie case of knowledge by proof of actual or exclusive constructive possession, but proof of nonexclusive constructive possession alone is insufficient to justify an implication of knowledge. In the latter situation, the State must present some corroborating evidence of knowledge to establish a prima facie case.
Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 740 (Fla.1996).
“In the case of a jointly-occupied vehicle, knowledge and ability to control the contraband may not be inferred, but must be established by independent proof.” E.A.M. v. State, 684 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). “This proof must consist either of evidence of actual knowledge of the contraband’s presence or evidence of incriminating statements and circumstances from which the jury reasonably might infer the accused’s actual knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” A.C. v. State, 658 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Because the State failed to present the essential evidence, we reverse.
CASANUEVA, J., concurs.
THREADGILL, J., dissents with opinion.
THREADGILL, Judge,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the evidence offered by the State was sufficient to sustain the adjudications of delinquency by the trial court. I would affirm.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Downard v. State, 793 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…knowledge and ability to control the contraband may not be inferred, but must be established by independent proof.” E.A.M. v. State, 684 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); see also Cruz v. State, 744 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); K.D.G. v. State, 720 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Green v. State, 667 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). As in E.A.M., Cruz, K.D.G., and Green, the State failed to present independent [*85] proof that the defendant knew of the presence of the drugs or their illicit nature, or that h…
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D.M.C. v. State, 869 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…D.M.C. made no incriminating statement and there was no other circumstance from which his ability to exercise control over the drugs could be inferred. See Lopez, 711 So. 2d at 565; Cruz v. State, 744 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); K.D.G. v. State, 720 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Green, 667 So. 2d 208; E.A.M. v. State, 684 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Giddens v. State, 443 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). In CM. v. State, 818 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), we stated: We maintain the position that in so…
Authorities Cited
- Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996)
- E.A.M. v. State, 684 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- A.C. v. State, 658 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)