CONNIE MELTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the denial of appellant's Rule 3.850 postconviction motion challenging the voluntariness of her guilty plea, but permitted refiling with proper sworn allegations.
A postconviction motion alleging an involuntary plea due to threats of harsher treatment is facially deficient when factual allegations are presented in an unsworn memorandum rather than in the sworn motion itself.
[1] Postconviction claims under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 are facially deficient when factual allegations supporting the claim are presented in an unsworn memo…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a guilty plea is not voluntary if induced by threats of harsher treatment should the defendant insist upon his right to a trial”
Citing Dutton v. State, 504 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), establishing the legal standard for involuntary pleas based on threats.
Appellant filed a Rule 3.850 postconviction motion claiming her plea was involuntary based on threats of harsher treatment if she proceeded to trial. …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges the denial of her posteonvietion motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Only one claim by appellant merits discussion.
In her motion, appellant alleged her plea was involuntary based on threats of harsher treatment if she insisted on proceeding to trial. The trial court was correct that this involuntary plea claim was legally insufficient because appellant never stated who coerced her, what threats were made or that she would not have pled but for these threats. Appellant filed a motion for rehearing in which she supplied the missing information. She also cited Dutton v. State, 504 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding a guilty plea is not voluntary if induced by threats of harsher treatment should the defendant insist upon his right to a trial). However, the rehearing motion was not under oath, and therefore the trial court was not required to consider the additional facts raised therein to support that claim. See, e.g., Raines v. State, 625 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Peavy v. State, 599 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (posteonvietion claims are facially deficient when factual allegations forming the basis of the relief sought are set forth in an accompanying memorandum of law which is not under oath as required by rule 3.850). Accordingly, our affirmance on that claim only is without prejudice for appellant to refile it in a properly sworn motion which complies with rule 3.850, within 60 days from the date of this opinion. See, e.g., Barfield v. State, 671 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
AFFIRMED.
MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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State v. Owran Green, 944 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2006)…or, because the reply was unsworn and was filed after the trial court denied his motion. A trial court is not required to consider facts raised in an unsworn supplemental pleading when ruling on a postconviction challenge to a plea. Melton v. State, 720 So. 2d 577, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Further, a trial court is obligated to consider an amended pleading only if it is filed before the court rules on the motion. See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 517-18 (Fla.1999) (holding that trial court erred in declini…
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Spradley v. State, 868 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…, 685 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, Spradley’s motion for rehearing, which alleged these additional facts, was not under oath, and therefore the trial court was not required to consider the motion for rehearing. See Melton v. State, 720 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Spradley’s rule 3.850 motion. Our affirmance is without prejudice to Spradley’s right to file a facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion, within sixty days of the date of the…
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Hickey v. State, 763 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In other cases, this court has given parties a short period of time to file a procedurally conforming motion, where the original motion was timely filed. See Barfield v. State, 671 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Melton v. State, 720 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We believe movant should be given a short, specific period of time beyond the limitation period to cure the procedural defect. Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand the matter to the trial court. Appellant shal…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Desi Arnez Barfield v. State, 671 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Peavy v. State, 599 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Dutton v. State, 504 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Raines v. State, 625 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)