DIANE BAGLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL BAGLEY, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage action, the former wife appealed the trial court's denial of permanent alimony, its bridge-the-gap award, and its refusal to award attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed the first two issues but reversed and remanded on the attorney's fees issue, holding that the trial court failed to consider the appellee's nonmarital assets when evaluating his ability to pay.
The court affirmed the trial court's decisions on permanent alimony and bridge-the-gap alimony. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney's fees, holding that the trial court must consider both parties' nonmarital assets as well as income-earning abilities when evaluating the ability to pay attorney's fees under Florida Statute section 61.16.
[1] A trial court must consider the nonmarital assets of the parties when determining the ability to pay attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action.
[2] The purpose of attorney's fees awards in dissolution proceedings is to ensure that both parties can retain competent legal counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes.”
Establishes the legal standard for awarding attorney's fees in family law cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDiane and Paul Bagley were parties to a dissolution of marriage action. The trial court awarded Diane a bridge-the-gap award but denied her permanent …
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SHAHOOD, Judge.
Appellant, former wife, appeals from Final Judgment in a dissolution of marriage action in which she alleges that the trial court committed reversible error with respect to three issues. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying former wife an award of permanent alimony; that the trial court erred in both the amount and characterization of its “bridge the gap” award to appellant; and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award appellant attorney’s fees in light of appellant’s and appellee’s disparate financial condition.
We affirm the first two issues raised by appellant without further discussion. We find merit in the third point raised by appellant and accordingly, reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to amend its Final Judgment.
An award of attorney’s fees in a dissolution proceeding depends upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes. See Segall v. Segall, 708 So. 2d 983, 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (1995) provides that, after considering the financial resources of both parties, the court may order one party to pay the other’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The purpose of this law is to insure that both parties are able to retain competent legal counsel. See Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976). Thus, the proper inquiry is whether one spouse has a need for such fees and the other has the ability to pay them. See Segall, 708 So. 2d at 989.
In considering a request for attorney’s fees, it is appropriate for the court to consider the wife’s need for assistance to prevent the inequitable diminution of her share of the equitable distribution. See Kendall v. Kendall, 677 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In addition, the court can look to the nonmarital assets as well as the parties’ income-earning abilities in considering the financial resources of the parties under section 61.16. See id.
In this ease, while the trial court appropriately considered income-earning abilities of the parties, it failed to consider the nonmarital assets of the parties. Here, the appellee’s nonmarital assets vastly exceeded those of the appellant and should have been taken into consideration when establishing ability to pay attorney’s fees. See Chandler v. Chandler, 624 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
We therefore affirm the judgment in all respects except for the disallowance of appellant’s attorney’s fees. We accordingly remand to the trial"court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine an appropriate amount to be awarded to former wife for attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
STEVENSON, J., and COHN, JAMES I., Associate Judge, concur.
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Nicolaus von Baillou v. von Baillou, 959 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…2d at 699; Bane, 775 So. 2d at 941. The central inquiry under section 61.16 is whether one spouse has a need for fees and the other spouse has the ability to pay them. See Blaine v. Blaine, 869 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Bagley v. Bagley, 720 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Financial need is “the hidden notion in the statutory term ‘financial resources of both parties.’ ” Satter v. Satter, 709 So. 2d 617, 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “Need” is “the necessity for some financial assistance to engage…
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Conlan v. Conlan, 43 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…(Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Satter v. Satter, 709 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). It is appropriate for a court to award attorney’s fees to avoid an inequitable diminution of the spouse’s share of equitable distribution. Bagley v. Bagley, 720 So. 2d 582, 583-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The question of what is considered “inequitable diminution” is a fact-sensitive one. In June 2006 and January 2007, the trial court awarded Wife temporary attorney’s fees and costs totaling $117,000. By the end of trial…
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Pinder v. Jacquelyn Pinder, 911 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…aring. For purposes of determining whether to award fees in a dissolution [*874] proceeding, a court can look to nonmarital assets as well as the parties’ income-earning abilities in considering the financial resources of parties. Bagley v. Bagley, 720 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In the context of the present case, the trial court, on remand, did not properly evaluate the Former Wife’s ability and the Former Husband’s need in regard to the fee motions and this court’s orders. Instead, it simply determine…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976)
- Bart L. Segall v. Segall, 708 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Chandler v. Chandler, 624 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Kendall v. Kendall, 677 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)