JOE PLAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joe Plain was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with battery and aggravated battery. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and rejected his argument that the Prison Release Re-offender Act, which increased penalties for crimes committed within three years of release from prison, constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him.
The Prison Release Re-offender Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to appellant. The Act increases the penalty for a crime committed after its enactment based on a prior release from prison; this is analogous to habitual offender sentencing, which does not constitute an ex post facto violation even when the underlying prior convictions predate the habitual offender law.
[1] The Prison Release Re-offender Act, which increases penalties for offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility, is not an unconstit…
[2] A statute that imposes a punishment only on future crimes is not an ex post facto law, even if a prior conviction results in increased punishment for the subsequent offen…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a habitual offender sentence is not an additional penalty for the earlier crime, but rather a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is an aggravated offense by virtue of the repetition”
Establishes the foundational principle distinguishing enhanced sentencing based on prior conduct from ex post facto punishment; the court uses this standard from Gryger v. Burke to analyze the Prison Release Re-offender Act.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was released from prison before the Prison Release Re-offender Act (effective May 30, 1997) became law. He committed a felony on August 4, 1…
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant was convicted of burglary of a dwelling with a battery and aggravated battery. We affirm all issues, but discuss one, whether the Prison Release Re-offender Act is an ex post facto law as applied to appellant.
The Act, section 775.082(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which became effective May 30, 1997, provides for greater penalties for offenses committed within three years of release from a state correctional facility. § 775.082(8)(a)1.
Appellant was released from prison before the Act became effective, and was convicted in this case for a crime which occurred on August 4, 1997. He comes within the language of the Act because he committed a felony enumerated in the Act within three years of being released from a state correctional facility.
We conclude that the Act is not being unconstitutionally applied to appellant as an ex post facto law. In this case, the Act increases the penalty for a crime committed after the Act, based on release from prison resulting from a conviction which occurred prior to the Act. It is no different than a defendant receiving a stiffer sentence under a habitual offender law for a crime committed after the passage of the law, where the underlying convictions giving the defendant habitual offender status occurred prior to the passage of the law. Under those circumstances habitual offender laws have been held not to constitute ex post facto law violations. Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla.1962); Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380 (1928); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948)(a habitual offender sentence is not an additional penalty for the earlier crime, but rather a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is an aggravated offense by virtue of the repetition); McDonald v. Commonwealth of Mass., 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901)(a statute which imposes a punishment only on future crimes is not ex post facto, notwithstanding that a conviction prior to the statute results in increased punishment).
We find the other issues raised by the appellant to be without merit. Affirmed.
WARNER, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (29 total)
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Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)…t), review granted, No. SC0CM16, 767 So. 2d 454 (Fla. May 23, 2000); Gray v. State, 742 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act and agreeing with the Fourth District’s ex post facto analysis in Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)), review granted, 751 So. 2d 1252 (Fla.2000); Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that the Act was not an ex post facto law as applied to a defendant who was released from prison before the Act became effe…1 / 2
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Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…391 (1992); see generally Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (deciding on double jeopardy grounds). The Act is not being unconstitutionally applied to Rollinson as an ex post facto law. See Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585 [*588] (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. denied, 727 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1999). III SINGLE SUBJECT Rollinson committed his offenses on July 19, 1997. The Act was codified as section 775.082(8) on May 30, 1997. Rol-linson does not have standing to make a cons…
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Verro Chambers v. State, 752 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), cited in Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). See also Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Jennings v. State, 744 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Plain v. State, 720 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 727 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1999). Nevertheless, application of the act would violate ex post facto principles if the “qualifying events” for purposes of the statute occurred before the act became effective, i.e., i…
Previewing 3 of 29 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (U.S. 1948)
- Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768 (Fla. 1928)
- McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (U.S. 1901)
- Reynolds v. Cochran, 138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962)