THE SCHOOL BOARD OF INDIAN RIVER COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
EDWARD LIVAUDAIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND MICHAEL LIVAUDAIS, INDIVIDUALLY, RESPONDENTS
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The court dismissed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging a trial judge's denial of a motion to recuse because the case was tried before a different judge, rendering the recusal issue moot.
A petition to recuse a trial judge becomes moot when the case is tried before a different judge and the judge against whom recusal was sought has no exposure to the witness whose relationship with the judge formed the basis for the recusal motion.
[1] A motion to recuse becomes moot when the underlying case is tried before a different judge and the judge whose recusal was sought has no exposure to the witness whose rel…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe School Board of Indian River County sought to disqualify the trial judge due to his relationship with a potential witness for the respondents. The…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge because of the relationship between the judge and one of respondent’s possible witnesses. The trial judge had sua sponte disqualified himself in another proceeding where the same witness was to testify. The trial judge denied the motion to recuse, and petitioner filed this petition for a writ of prohibition. However, subsequent to the filing of the instant application, a senior judge was assigned to try petitioner’s case, and we determined that the petition was therefore moot. After the trial a motion for attorney’s fees was set before the original trial judge, and upon motion by petitioner, we reinstated this petition.
We dismiss the petition on the grounds that the motion of recusal was based upon possible bias surrounding the trial judge’s relationship with a potential witness for respondent. Since the ease was tried before a different judge, and there was no exposure of the first judge to the witness, the reason for recusal has been removed. There is no allegation that this same witness will testify in regard to any post-trial motions, such as the attorney’s fee motion which has already been set. Therefore, we conclude once again that the petition is moot and accordingly dismiss it.
DELL, WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Stein v. State, 995 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2008)…TE, J., concur. . Patterson v. State, 513 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1987) (admonishing against the practice by judges of delegating the drafting of a death sentencing order to the State). . The State cites School Board of Indian River County v. Livaudais, 720 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), for the proposition that it was not improper for the trial judge to continue presiding over the case. In Livaudais, the trial judge stepped aside throughout the entire tri [*346] al because of a relationship with a witness. Id.…